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Abstract
As physician, educator, former medical administrator, 
and member of the National Academy of Sciences, Lewis 
Thomas has been one of the most eloquent spokespersons for 
the scientific community.
This dissertation analyzes twenty-four of Thomas’ 
popular scientific essays. These essays reveal a union of 
traditional scientific values and popular romantic themes, 
what is called here a rhetorical synthesis. The term 
synthesis is understood as the putting of two or more 
things together to form a whole, particularly suggesting a 
reconciliation of two philosophically opposing forces. 
Thomas’ essays reflect a synthesis insofar as they merge 
what have traditionally been thought to be two opposing 
philosophical views of reality, science and romanticism. 
This synergistic reconciliation of two opposing 
philosophical forces is understood to produce a third 
philosophical view of reality, which combines elements from 
the two original views of reality yet is a separate, 
independent philosophical perspective. Thomas’ synthesis of 
traditional scientific values and popular romantic themes 
produces a particularly humane version of science, and is 
rhetorical insofar as it is purposefully designed to 
produce a romantic science capable of mitigating the long­
standing dispute between science and humanism and to allay 
the public's fear about the social consequences of science.
Thomas' romantic orientation toward the world is 
characterized by six major themes: (1) faith in the
unconscious mind, (2) a vindication of the individual, (3) 
a predilection for diversity, ambiguity, and imperfection, 
(4) a preoccupation with qualities that are different, 
remote or mysterious in humans, (5) wonder and awe of 
nature, and (6) a concern for humankind’s moral 
characteristics. These six romantic tenets are identified 
as they appear in Thomas’ essays; the themes’ strategic 
location, function and rhetorical significance is 
assessed. In addition, this dissertation examines the 
scientific world view as it is set against the romantic 
world view in Thomas’ overall rhetorical design. This study 
also investigates how Thomas’ romantic version of science 
clarifies the moral role of science in society.
This dissertation concludes that Thomas’ scientific- 
romantic synthesis operates as an effective rhetorical form 
for mediating the traditional controversy between science 
and humanism, and for establishing a more cooperative 
relationship between the scientific community and the 
general public.
v
Chapter One 
Introduction
The present tension between science and humanism can
be traced to the renaissance. Yet it was not until the
seventeenth and eighteenth century, during the birth of 
modern science, that the controversy between these two 
competing modes of thought took its modern form. At the 
center of the long-standing antagonism are two 
fundamentally opposite views of human purpose1 : humanism 
is essentially value oriented and devoted to the fullest 
self-realization of the human personality; it emphasizes 
humans* "moral, intellectual, and the aesthetic 
capacities."2 Science promotes rational thought as a means 
of gaining comprehensive empirical knowledge of the 
natural world; scientists are best characterized by their 
concern with material progress and the advancement of 
knowledge.3
Classic nineteenth century formulations of the tension 
between science and humanism are summarized in the 
opposing views of Matthew Arnold and his chief antagonist, 
T. H. Huxley. In "Culture and Education," Huxley argued 
that "the pretensions of our modern humanists to the
possession of the monopoly of culture and to the exclusive 
inheritance of the spirit of antiquity must be abated, if 
not abandoned."4 Huxley believed that science and not
1
literature must supply the knowledge which is necessary for 
an age committed to rational truth and material 
practicality. In his essay entitled "Literature and 
Science," Arnold answered Huxley's charge by admitting the 
value of science, noting that science is an "excellent" and 
"valuable" discipline with which everyone should have some 
experience; the results of scientific investigation, as 
Arnold put it, have a "visible bearing on human life," and 
should have a place in education.8 Arnold concludes, 
however, that science does not serve the instincts for 
conduct or beauty. These instincts are best nurtured by 
culture, which is not to be thought of strictly as 
literature or belles lettres, but as comprising all humane 
intellectual disciplines.
In the twentieth century C. P. Snow’s "Two Cultures" 
rekindled debate regarding the rival claims of humanism and 
science. Snow believed that the intellectual life of 
western society was being divided into two uncommunicating 
and mutually indifferent cultures. Nonscientists, in Snow’s 
estimation, believe that scientists are "shallowly 
optimistic, unaware of man’s condition."® Scientists, on 
the other hand, thought that literary intellectuals were 
lacking foresight and were in a "deep sense anti­
intellectual, anxious to restrict both art and thought to 
the existential moment."7 The most significant difference 
between the scientist and the literary intellectual,
according to Snow, is the attitude with which each responds 
to the "tragic" nature of the human condition. The essence 
of life’s tragedy lies in the solitary nature of human 
existence. In Snow’s words, "each of us is alone," and 
"each of us dies."8 The awareness of humans’ tragic 
circumstances makes a moral trap, "for it tempts one to 
sit back, complacent in one’s unique tragedy," and to 
ignore the everyday sufferings of fellow human beings.9 
Snow believed that literary intellectuals are more likely 
than scientists to fall into this moral trap; unlike the 
literary intellectual, who is resigned to the tragic fate 
of his or her fellow human beings, the scientist is 
"inclined to be impatient to see if something can be done, 
until it’s proved otherwise," and has a spirit which is 
"tough and good and determined to fight it out at the side 
of their brother men."10 Offering no solid resolution to 
the two culture’s controversy, Snow concluded that a less 
specialized educational system, mainly in the primary and 
secondary schools, but also in the universities, may help 
to resolve the differences between scientists and literary 
intellectuals.
Science has enjoyed unprecedented material success in 
the twenty-five years since Snow delivered his lecture on 
"The Two Cultures." Nonscientists in American culture can 
not ignore the successes of scientific research; they 
perceive a direct link between the technological advances
of science and a rising standard of living. Furthermore, 
many nonscientists share the belief that science has great 
potential for problem solving. The widespread belief in 
science as the preeminent method of obtaining objective 
knowledge has led some to "imitate models and approaches 
of scientific research in the solution of social,
political, and ... above all technological and medical 
problems."41
While science continues to enjoy tremendous material 
success, the old dialectic between science and humanism is 
still raging in American culture, and is represented in 
various forms. For example, Janice Rushing and Thomas 
Frentz argue that the Frankenstein myth in popular culture 
symbolizes a repressed fear the culture has about its 
relationship to technology.12 Noted physicist and Catholic 
priest, Stanley Jaki, has spoken of the technical limits of 
science, the debilitating effects of science on public 
moral reason, and the need for more religious and spiritual 
insights into human social and moral decision-making.13 
Indeed the contemporary debate appears more often than not 
to focus on the American public's increasing apprehension 
about the moral and ethical consequences of the scientific 
enterprise.14 When debating the social consequences of 
science, humanists and scientists often implicitly address 
themselves to what the proper disposition of the human mind 
should be: humanists typically argue that science does not
consider moral consciousness; they perceive the advance of 
science as a threat and the "scientific utopia as a 
wasteland void of spirituality."15 The scientific 
epistemology usually attempts to divorce science from its 
consequences.16 Scientists have often suggested that the 
advancement of knowledge and the mastery of humankind over 
fate will somehow lead to the realization of utopian 
promise.17 Moreover, scientists seem to agree that the act 
of rational inquiry is at the essence of humanity and the 
discovery of new information about nature, at whatever 
level, should not be impeded. This is not to say that 
scientists in general are not aware of the moral 
consequences of their work, but merely that scientists are 
primarily concerned with the doing of science. More 
important for present purposes, the public does not 
perceive scientists as being concerned with public moral 
argument.
Lloyd Bitzer's conceptualization of the terms rhetoric, 
exigence, and rhetorical exigence helps to illustrate the 
persuasive significance of Thomas* essays. Bitzer claims 
that rhetoric is a "mode of altering reality ... by the 
creation of discourse which changes reality through the 
mediation of thought and action."18 He defines an exigence 
as an "imperfection marked by urgency ... a defect ... an 
obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is 
other than it should be."19 Bitzer explains that an
exigence is rhetorical "when it is capable of positive 
modification and when positive modification requires
discourse or can be assisted by discourse."20 From Bitzer’s 
rhetorical perspective, the public’s maturing awareness of 
the disturbing consequences of science is a rhetorical 
exigence which threatens to undermine science’s privileged 
status in modern society.21 The importance of public 
involvement in scientific and technological issues that may 
affect society has been well documented in literature on 
the rhetoric of public science.22 Contemporary 
communication scholars have examined the tension which 
occurs when scientific or technical information is 
disseminated into the public realm. Thomas G. Goodnight, 
for example, distinguished between the personal, technical, 
and public "spheres" of argument. "Sphere denotes branches 
of activity— the grounds upon which arguments are built and 
the authorities to which arguers appeal."23 Goodnight 
concluded that the public sphere is being steadily eroded 
by the elevation of the personal and technical groundings 
of argument. Thomas Farrell and Goodnight focused on two 
competing modes of discourse: Technical versus Social
reasoning. The authors argue that in an ideal world "each 
type of reasoning would perform separate, but 
complementary, functions."24 After completing their 
investigation of the communication practices surrounding 
the Three Mile Island incident, however, the authors
determined that technical reasoning and its concomitant 
communication practices may actually usurp the role of 
social reasoning and impede public deliberation.25 Alan 
Gross came to a similar conclusion after examining the DNA 
controversy as a social drama played out between two 
competing ideologies: the social and the technical. Gross 
concluded that the recombinant DNA debate highlights the 
failure of technical knowledge to resolve social, ethical, 
and political dilemmas.2 6 Michael Calvin McGee and Martha 
Anne Martin argued that the public’s uncritical acceptance 
of expert advice from scientists and technologists is a 
result of our culture’s faith in the rational model of 
argument. The authors believe that "a new consciousness of 
expertise is required, one which is properly skeptical of 
claims to practical or technical knowledge."27 Finally, 
Walter Fisher proposed the narrative paradigm as an 
alternative to the traditional rational paradigm of human 
deliberation and action.28 In general, then, communication 
scholars admit that current technical and social ideologies 
are inadequate for resolving public controversy; these 
scholars propose solutions that avoid constricted paradigms 
and a narrow view of what it means to be rational.29
To summarize, an intellectual division has existed 
between science and humanism in modern western society. 
This division is characterized by the differing aims and 
values with which scientists and humanists approach
reality. Humanism focuses on the complete intellectual 
capacity and particular experience of the individual, 
emphasizing his or her moral, intellectual and aesthetic
ability. Science emphasizes rational inquiry and is
primarily concerned with the acquisition and 
systematization of knowledge about the natural world. In
addition, the highly specialized language of science and 
technology have proven particularly inadequate to resolve 
the intellectual tension which exists between citizen and 
expert when technological matters impinge upon ordinary 
life. In fact, the general public’s increasing apprehension 
about the social and moral implications of science presents 
the scientific community with a rhetorical challenge which 
threatens to undermine science’s preeminent role in 
society.
A number of contemporary scientists, including Robert 
Jastrow, Carl Sagan, and Stephen J. Gould have defended the 
sanctity of science and bridged the philosophical division 
between the scientific community and the general public.30 
The general purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
selected essays from the "popular scientific discourse" of 
another scientist, Lewis Thomas.31 The general argument to 
be advanced here is that Thomas’ popular scientific essays 
mediate rhetorically the traditional dichotomy between 
science and humanism, and envision a cooperative
relationship between the scientific community and the 
general public.
Thus, the significance of this dissertation is
threefold. This study attempts to (1) build upon previous 
research in the rhetoric of science to further our
understanding of how scientists use certain rhetorical 
forms both to share and to legitimate their interpretation 
of reality along with their vision regarding the cultural 
role of science; (2) provide insight into how popular
scientific discourse can potentially mediate the long 
standing controversy between science and humanism; and (3) 
illustrate that the popularization of science should be 
regarded as an aspect of rhetoric rather than exclusively 
or simply as an aspect of science or literature.
Lewis Thomas: A Contemporary Public Scientist
Lewis Thomas was born in Flushing, New York, November 
25, 1913. He graduated from Princeton University and the 
Harvard Medical School. He has served as Professor of 
Pediatric Research at the University of Minnesota, as 
Chairman of the departments of pathology and medicine; he 
was also dean at the New York University Bellevue Medical 
Center and Chairman of pathology and dean at Yale Medical 
School. Thomas has most recently served as president of 
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City.32 
As physician, educator, former medical administrator, and 
member of the National Academy of Sciences, Thomas has been
10
one of the most eloquent spokespersons for the scientific 
community. He has written three collections of essays: The 
Lives of A Cell: Notes of a Biology Watcher. Medusa and the 
Snail: More Notes of a Biology Watcher. and Late Night 
Thoughts on Listening to Mahler's Ninth Symphony.33 The 
essays included in these collections cover a wide range of 
topics. Yet all have a common goal: to prove that the 
dichotomy between science and humanism need not exist. 
Thomas * most recent book, The Youngest Science: Notes of a 
Medicine Watcher, was sponsored by the Sloan Foundation.34 
The Foundation was interested in "the encouragement of a 
public understanding of science," and wished "to encourage 
a representative selection of accomplished and articulate 
scientists to set down their own accounts of their lives in 
science."35 Consequently The Youngest Science is a 
personal memoir, an autobiographical account of Thomas’ 
experiences as a medical student, doctor, and senior 
researcher. This book illustrates how medicine in this 
century has become more like one of the traditional 
sciences.
All four of Thomas’ books were national best sellers 
and widely reviewed in respected newspapers and 
periodicals, such as Nature. Christian Science Monitor, New 
York Times. Kirkus Review. and the Times Literary 
Supplement. Thomas’ discourse has captured the attention of 
members of the academic community as well.
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Two dissertations offer a description of the literary 
qualities of Thomas’ essays, focusing primarily upon his 
essays as literary forms. Diane Dowdey’s dissertation, for 
example, includes an analysis of Thomas* essays in its 
discussion of the literary scientific essay as a literary 
form. The study borrows from the Neo-Aristotlian method of 
criticism to analyze Thomas* work according to the 
rhetorical canons of invention, structure, and style; it 
concentrated on the craftsmanship of Thomas’ essays while 
assuming their rhetorical potency. Dowdey’s study does not, 
however, examine the way Thomas’ essays employ popular 
cultural themes strategically both to ameliorate the 
general public’s apprehension about the social consequences 
of science and to preserve science’s privileged position in 
modern society.36 Laurie White’s dissertation argued that 
as an essayist Lewis Thomas is best understood in the 
tradition of Montaigne; this tradition reveals Thomas’ 
reliance on self deprecation and lyricism to convey his 
message.3 7
In her 1975 study, Barbara Lounsberry recognized the
literary/rhetorical significance of Thomas* work. She
explained that:
the writings of Lewis Thomas ... revive and expand 
several of the most fundamental themes to 
nineteenth century American literature: humanism, 
interest in the self and society, and confidence 
in language and rational inquiry as tools for 
arriving at higher levels of individual and 
social progress.38
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In summary, previous research has given cursory 
acknowledgement to Thomas* rhetorical skill, while 
primarily focusing on his writings from the vantage point 
of literary criticism. No research to date, however, has 
delineated the rhetorical significance of the popular 
cultural themes which pervade Thomas’ work.
Thomas’ first collection of essays, Lives of the Cell, 
won the National Book award in 1974. Interestingly, there 
was debate between the Science and Arts-and-Letters panels 
of the nominating committee in regard to which panel should 
confer the award. In the end, the National Book award was 
given to The Lives of The Cell, not as the best book in 
science, but in arts-and-letters.39 Still, whether one
chooses to include Thomas’ writings under the heading of 
science or arts-and-letters, one point seems clear: 
Thomas’ discourse merges popular cultural themes with 
traditional scientific values, and thus may help mediate 
the old dichotomy between science and humanism and allay 
the public’s anxieties about the scientific enterprise. 
Surely, Thomas is not the only writer in the history of 
Western Civilization to promote science or humanism in his 
work, or to enlist literary-rhetorical devices to champion 
particular scientific or humanistic values. Galileo comes 
to mind as a scientist using literary (e.g., dialogue) 
means to espouse Copernican ideas in a strongly religious, 
anti-Copernican cultural milieu. Similarly, John Milton and
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John Donne employed literary means to introduce popular
readers to radical scientific shifts in world view. In our
own time, Albert Einstein, Neils Bohr and other scientists,
not to mention the huge corpus of writing that goes under
the title of science fiction, have spoken eloquently of
science’s place in the cosmos. But Thomas is particularly
worthy of attention because throughout his work there is an
implicit assumption that values guiding scientific research
are compatible with the public’s needs; moreover, Thomas’
discourse addresses the public’s increasing moral and
ethical distrust of science in a world where science has
gained unprecedented success and status. In essence, Thomas
grants science a central role in human affairs; he
maintains science's preeminent role in society by
discussing a number of timely scientific issues likely to
impact the public. Thomas’ writing provides the
nonscientist with a sympathetic understanding of the
process and manner of scientific thinking. Through the
creative, persuasive use of cultural themes Thomas is able
to legitimate the scientific perspective to nonscientists
as a worthwhile intellectual and pragmatic activity. But he
does so by enlisting the idiom of the public. As Joyce
Carol Oates notes in The New York Review of Books:
[Lewis Thomas] ... anticipates the kind of writing 
that will appear more frequently, as scientists 
take on the language of poets in order to 
communicate human truths too mysterious for old 
fashioned common sense ...40
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More than just utilizing popular forms, though, Thomas 
effects a merger between the scientific worldview and 
popular cultural themes. He seems to understand that 
science may be losing its ability to shape public 
consciousness and to engage in public moral argument. For 
this reason, as Oates notes, Thomas’ discourse is valuable 
to our culture, like the work of our most prized poets or 
artists. He has absorbed innumerable facts from a variety 
of disciplines, and given us speculative essays in which 
scientific information is "transcended and something 
approaching a vision of unity is attempted." 41 What kind 
of vision— its merits and its limitations— will be the 
topic of this dissertation.
Review Of The Literature 
Traditionally rhetoric and science have been regarded 
as antithetical modes of human activity. Contemporary 
scholars have, however, adapted a new perspective on the 
relationship between rhetoric and science. For instance, 
philosophers and sociologists such as Thomas Kuhn, Jacob 
Bronowski, and Michael Polanyi, have examined the social 
rhetorical implications of science.42 In addition, 
contemporary communication scholars have examined the 
manner in which scientists employ persuasive strategies to 
legitimate their arguments to fellow scientists within the 
scientific community.43 More important for purposes of 
this dissertation,' however, is a survey of literature on
15
public science. A review of rhetorical scholarship reveals 
that there is no agreed upon term for discourse which 
attempts to mediate scientific information for a mass 
audience. Consequently this dissertation employs one of the 
more frequently used terms, popular or public science, to 
describe scientific writings crafted for the nonscientist. 
What follows, then, is a survey of studies which examine 
the persuasive strategies scientists use to convey 
scientific information to the nonscientist.
Essays About the Texts of Popular Science
”In Rhetoric and Science Journalism," Ray Lynn Anderson 
asserts that in translating complex scientific information 
into the language of the intelligent nonscientist, "the 
science journalist guides (invents) his communication by 
systematically finding what rhetoricians call the common 
ground."44 Anderson explains that the science reporter 
carefully grounds his or her explanations with appropriate 
reference to those "broad aspirations and anxieties which 
as Americans they jointly hold."48 Anderson claims that 
Aristotle was the first to explain that materials for 
rhetorical argument should be drawn largely, although not 
exclusively, from the common conception of the good, what 
Aristotle called forms, common places or topoi.46 Anderson 
discusses the four most common techniques used by the 
science writer to sell science news, including portraying 
science as the major vehicle of social and economic
16
progress, projecting science as an object of entertainment, 
emphasizing science's relation to domestic ills or the cold 
war struggle, and focusing on the personalities of 
prominent scientists.47
John Angus Campbell has written several insightful 
essays which attempt to explicate the rhetorical nature of 
Charles Darwin's On The Origin of Species.48 In "Charles 
Darwin and the Crisis of Ecology: A Rhetorical
Perspective," the author suggests that Darwin’s 
contemporaries understood The Origin as a justification of 
philosophy of competition in nature. Campbell explains that 
Darwin does not describe nature in neutral, dispassionate 
language; nor did he view nature simply as a "technical 
system in which means are intricately adapted to ends."49 
Rather, Darwin viewed nature with an attitude of awe and 
wonder. Yet Darwin’s attitude toward nature departs
somewhat from his immediate rhetorical tradition. Unlike 
his nineteenth century predecessors, Darwin does not 
justify nature's wondrous beauty through praise of a 
supreme being. Campbell states that Darwin’s attitude of 
awe "remains with the natural phenomena themselves, 
investing them with a ... sanctity which is inherent within 
them."50 Perhaps the essay’s most valuable conclusion, 
then, is that Darwin’s attitude toward nature provides a 
more hopeful legacy for the present age than was previously 
thought.
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Campbell's "The Polemical Mr. Darwin" identifies three 
persuasive strategies employed by Darwin to explain his 
ideas, including the use of conventional language, 
conventional religious categories of popular thought, and 
his own credibility. These findings suggest that the 
conventional image of Darwin as a dispassionate and 
detached investigator may not be accurate.51
In "Scientific Revolution and The Grammar of Culture: 
The Case of Darwin's Origin," Campbell argues that Darwin 
cleverly exploited Baconianism by invoking piety, relying 
on the method of inductionism, employing the language of 
natural theology, and pressuring readers to accept his 
analogies and metaphors as literal statements. As a 
persuasive text, The Origin's genius derives from its 
ability to "encourage the advancement of science, while at 
the same time ... protecting religion from skepticism, 
materialism, and atheism."52
John Lyne and Henry Howe’s essay, "Punctuated 
Equilibria: Rhetorical Dynamics of a Scientific
Controversy," provides a case study of how a theory 
originating in paleontology called "punctuated equilibria" 
found audiences in other scientific disciplines and 
eventually the public at large. The authors suggest that 
the notion of distinct technical and social spheres 
generally at odds with one another is not always sufficient 
apparatus for explaining what happens when scientific
arguments are presented to different audiences. The authors 
conclude that the persona of the scientific writer 
significantly affects the way a particular audience 
receives a scientific discourse; scientific theories 
generated within a particular scientific discipline 
sometimes elicit responses beyond that original 
discipline; different scientific disciplines have different 
vocabularies, so that "special tools and methods" are not 
the only "unities within a scientific discourse;" the use 
of "metaphors and imagery" may also determine the 
interpretive frameworks within the various sciences; and 
rhetorical analysts should understand that "new scientific 
theories gain attention partly because of the contrast they 
pose to existing theories." 83
In "Science and The Sacred Cosmos: The Ideological 
Rhetoric of Carl Sagan," Thomas Lessl argues that popular 
scientific discourse satisfies two purposes: "the practical 
purposes of maintaining the privileged status of science in 
society and the religious purpose of grounding faith in an 
unimpeachable body of knowledge."54 Lessl attempts to 
understand the television series Cosmos as an example of 
public science and employs Burkean terms to enumerate four 
characteristics particularly salient to popular treatments 
of science, including consubstantiality, division, 
identification, and substance.55 In discussing these terms, 
Lessl notes that the subject matter of science is little
19
understood by the nonscientist. Thus, to establish a common 
ground the scientist must often step outside science. To 
deal with division from the rest of the culture, scientists 
must persuasively enter the political arena to lobby for 
the financial support of research programs which are 
increasingly expensive. On another level, scientists are 
forced to make non-scientific justifications for their 
work, and to struggle with other interest groups over 
control of the educational system. Divisions are resolved 
by the presentation of symbols of identification, such as 
natural objects of inquiry (i.e. stars, living organisms), 
through which people can mediate reality and organize their 
actions.56 These objects of scientific inquiry are already 
invested with a sacred quality for the general public, and 
act as common symbols uniting the scientific community with 
the general public. Finally, Lessl explains that "in acting 
together, people share a common substance; they share 
common sensations, concepts, images, and ideas that unite 
them in attitude and spirit."57 Mediational rhetoric, to be 
successful, must symbolically allow the nonscientist to 
participate in the scientific enterprise; rhetoric which 
bridges the division between the scientific community and 
the public at large must allow the nonscientist to "view 
himself metaphorically as if he were a scientist."58
Lessl's "The Priestly Voice" divides public
communication into fundamental priestly and bardic
20
categories and examines the problems and significance, of 
priestly communication, focusing particularly on its 
implications for critical exploration of the public
discourse of scientists. A bard is described as a poetical 
symbolist whose messages speak to "the world of common 
sense experience already integral to its audience’s
identity."89 Priestly rhetoric, the main category of 
discourse focused upon, is referred to as "that rhetoric
which crosses the boundaries between a particular elite
subculture and the broader social groups within which it is 
nested as priestly."60 Simply put, priestly rhetoric 
promotes and maintains the specialized values of a closed 
system. The essay explains that the priestly scientist 
interprets a technical scientific vocabulary for the 
nonscientist, brings interpretations of established 
scientific theory and method to the general public, 
encourages public acceptance of orthodox science and, at 
the same time, stands as a rhetorical bulwark against 
oracles of pseudo-science, communicates his/her insights 
through oral rather than a written means, conceptualizes 
all phenomena from a scientific vantage point, and views 
the world through a veil of evolutionary mythology related 
to scientific evolutionary theory. In short, public science 
offers a variation of scientific evolutionary theory which 
includes an explanation for all varieties of change.
In "Heresy, Orthodoxy, and The Politics of Science"
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Lessl explains that public scientific rhetoric is often 
aimed at maintaining control of the symbolic and material 
resources that have already been entrusted to it. The study 
provides an example of such rhetoric through an analysis of 
the scientific community's response to the rhetorical 
efforts of religious fundamentalists to legally sanction 
the teaching of scientific creationism.61
In summary, contemporary rhetorical analysts have 
developed a fairly sophisticated understanding of the 
rhetorical strategies embedded in popular scientific 
discourse.64 For example, Campbell’s examination of The 
Origin of Species reveals that Darwin did not describe 
nature in neutral, dispassionate language, but used several 
persuasive strategies to explain his ideas to the 
nonscientist, including a use of language which reflected 
an attitude of wonder and awe toward nature, and 
conventional religious categories which protected religion 
from the skepticism, materialism, and atheism which might 
result from the advancement of science. Lyne and Howe 
conclude that the persona of the scientific writer 
influences the way a particular audience responds to a 
scientific discourse. Anderson notes that the science 
writer often draws his or her rhetorical arguments from the 
common conception of the good, what Aristotle called 
forms, common places or topoi. Lessl observed that the 
subject matter of science is little understood by the
22
nonscientist and that, as a result, scientists must step 
outside science to establish common ground with the larger 
culture. He identified rhetoric that crosses the boundaries 
between an elite subculture (e.g., the scientific 
community) and the broader social groups within which it is 
situated as priestly. Priestly rhetoric promotes and 
maintains the specialized values of a closed system but is 
directed toward an open and plural society. Lessl also 
noted that popular science satisfies two purposes: the 
practical purpose of maintaining science's elite status in 
society and the religious purpose of grounding faith in an 
unimpeachable body of knowledge. In essence, the rhetorical 
analyst's present understanding of the persuasive 
strategies found in popular scientific discourse provides 
him or her with a solid base from which to evaluate the 
social, economic, and political impact of science on 
society. The analyst should be aware, however, of the 
potential for change in the rhetorical dynamic between 
science and the general public, and of the possibility that 
scientists may develop new rhetorical forms both to share 
and to legitimate the scientific mindset with the 
nonscientist. For example, the present research on public 
science does not examine the rhetorical impact of the 
merger of popular cultural themes and traditional 
scientific values which pervades the public scientific 
essays of Lewis Thomas. As a result, the author of this
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dissertation asks: Is there a particular rhetorical form
reflected in Thomas' popular scientific writings? If so, 
what popular cultural traditions does it draw upon? If
there are a number of traditions, how are they accommodated 
in the discourse? If a particular rhetorical form is
reflected in Thomas’ essays, how might it provide the 
general public a greater role in establishing criteria for 
judgment for private and public decision-making? How might 
it highlight the general public’s capacity to respond to 
aspects of the world inaccessible to the interpretive
framework of science and ordinary rational thought? How 
might other scientists respond to the version of science 
proffered by Thomas? If a rhetorical form is reflected in 
Thomas’ discourse, does it draw upon the broad values and 
aspirations of the general culture, from what Aristotle 
called topoi? Do Thomas’ writings strive to maintain 
science’s privileged status in society?
Methodology
In defining rhetoric, this dissertation draws upon the 
work of three contemporary rhetoricians: Lloyd Bitzer,
Douglas W. Ehninger and Donald C. Bryant. As noted 
previously in this chapter, Bitzer defines rhetoric as "a 
mode of altering reality ... by the creation of discourse 
which changes reality through the mediation of thought and 
action."63 Following Kenneth Burke, Ehninger argued that 
rhetoric "is the art of symbolic inducement" and that
24
"rhetoricians should study all of the ways in which men may 
influence each other's thinking and behavior through the 
strategic use of symbols."64 This study is sympathetic to 
Bitzer and Ehninger's view of rhetoric; it agrees that 
rhetoric is a mode of altering reality through the
manipulation of symbols. Yet this study understands the 
term symbols in the delimited or narrow sense of language. 
Communication scholars have acknowledged that the limits or 
boundries of rhetoric are imprecise, and that rhetoric 
includes not only written or spoken language, but a wide 
range of symbolic human behaviors such as film, art, 
social protest, music, and architecture.65 For purposes of 
this study, an understanding of rhetoric as the strategic 
use of language provides a critical advantage since the 
persuasive success of Thomas’ essays depends strictly on 
the use of language. Thus, this study agrees with Bryant’s 
claim that "rhetoric is the function in human affairs which 
governs ... the phenomenon of the designed use of language 
for the promulgation of information, ideas, and attitudes."66 
Speaking more generally, this study agrees with Bryant that 
the "rhetorical function is the function of adjusting ideas 
to people and people to ideas."67 With an understanding of 
rhetoric as the strategic use of language, this 
dissertation employs a rhetorical analysis as a method for 
discovering and evaluating the persuasive strategies in the 
popular scientific writings of Lewis Thomas.
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To proceed, two additional definitions are necessary. 
First, a survey of rhetorical scholarship reveals that
there is no agreed upon term for discourse that attempts to 
mediate scientific information for a mass audience.
Consequently this dissertation employs one of the more 
frequently used terms, popular or public science, to
describe scientific discourse crafted for the nonscientist. 
Thomas’ writings mediate scientific information for a mass 
audience and are, to that extent, an example of popular or 
public science. Of course, not all popular scientific 
rhetoric is alike. One subsidiary purpose of this study is 
to speculate about how Thomas’ rhetoric differs from that 
of other public scientists, like Carl Sagan and Steven J. 
Gould. Second, the term rhetorical analysis is understood 
herein as the systematic inspection of persuasive language 
strategies of invention and organization of ideas. Through 
a close reading of Thomas’ discourse, this author will 
attempt to understand how Thomas uses language 
strategically to mediate the traditional controversy 
between science and humanism and to accommodate the 
aspirations and values of both scientists and the general 
public. More specifically, this author’s rhetorical 
analysis proceeds through three interrelated steps.
First, Thomas has published eighty-three popular 
scientific essays. This dissertation will examine twenty- 
four of these essays. The essays chosen for analysis
reflect themes that recur in all of Thomas’ writings. 
Second, initial examination of Thomas’ essays revealed an 
emphasis on certain romantic themes. Thus, this study will 
utilize the term "romanticism" to help explain certain 
humanistic themes in Thomas’ writings, and to define the 
prevailing tensions between science and humanism reflected 
in his popularization of science.
More than six hundred books and articles published
during the first half of the twentieth century attempt to
define romanticism.68 This enormous body of literature
reflects a consensus among scholars that the word
"romanticism" can be defined in a great many ways. For
example, The Handbook To Literature explains that
romanticism does have a fairly definite meaning for the
student of literature:
[Romanticism] designates a literary and 
philosophical theory that tends to see the 
individual at the very center of all life and 
experience, and it places the individual, 
therefore, at the center of art, making 
literature most valuable as an expression of 
unique feelings and particular attitudes... and 
valuing its accuracy in portraying the 
individual’s experience, however fragmentary and 
incomplete, more than it values its adherence to 
completeness, unity, or the demands of 
genre.69
In his classic work, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of 
the History of an Idea, Arthur Lovejoy contends that the 
word romantic has meant many different things in different 
countries and that even in a single country romantic is 
often used in conflicting senses.70 In "The Rise of
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Modern Science and the Genesis of Romanticism," Hans 
Eichner notes that "... romanticism is not a technical 
term...invented to name a precise concept, but a word with 
a long, complicated history."71 In "Science and 
Romanticism," Edward Proffitt states that the word 
"romantic is generally associated with the vaguely 
spiritual, with the flabbily aspirational, with everything 
at odds with science and the inductive method ,.."72 In 
"Toward a Theory of Romanticism," Morse Peckham adds that 
although the word romanticism refers to any number of 
things, one of its primary referents is "a specific
historical movement in art and ideas which occurred in 
Europe and America in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries."73 The essence of this historical 
movement is reflected in a shift in American and European 
thought against the spirit and implications of modern 
science. Proffitt explains that what the romantic reacts to
"is not so much a procedure as an underlying view of life
based on a mechanistic model."74 Eichner provides a cogent 
summary of the mechanistic philosophy of early modern
science:
The new science that began with Copernicus and 
Galileo sought to explain the world rationally in 
terms of the laws of nature, and these laws, like 
reason itself, were thought to hold uniformly at 
all times and places. It seemed natural that human 
beings, the most rational of creatures, should be 
equally timeless in their essence.75
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Eichner suggests that there was an intimate connection 
between mechanistic assumptions and faith in reason and 
observation. "If nature worked like a great engine, human 
beings, who built engines, could unriddle its secrets, 
using the same thought processes that they used building 
engines."7 6
In other words, early modern science developed a series 
of natural laws which applied to the cosmos uniformally; 
these laws helped create and sustain a mechanistic 
philosophy which conceived the cosmos as a static mechanism 
(a perfectly running machine is the most common metaphor of 
this metaphysic). Viewing the cosmos as static meant that 
"all possibilities of reality were realized from the 
beginning, and that these possibilities were arranged in a 
complete series, a hierarchy from God down to nothingness 
. . . " 7 7  The assumptions undergirding the mechanical 
philosophy helped shape the prevailing neoclassical value 
system of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The 
neoclassical value system included an emphasis on 
perfection, changelessness, uniformity, and rationalism.
The romantic movement represented a radical change from 
the classical episteme which preceded it; romanticism 
replaced the mechanistic assumptions associated with modern 
science with organicism. The organic reality model assumes 
a cosmos infinitely more complex than the one described by 
mechanistic science; it conceives the cosmos as an
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organism, not a machine. Furthermore, the romantic
epistemology understands that:
the way in which we know what it is like to be a 
living being is fundamentally different from the 
way we know how a [machine] works, ... we know 
about our own existence by introspection.78
While recognizing the limitations of using any one
definition of romanticism, the literature in general
suggests at least the following recurring themes: the
creative imagination, intellectual intuition, the
unconscious, a preoccupation with what is different,
remote, mysterious, awe-inspiring, a return to nature, a
reaction against the scientific method, diversity, change,
imperfection, and a vindication of the individual.79 This
dissertation, then, understands romanticism as the complex
cluster of themes mentioned above. It will be argued that
Thomas' romantic orientation toward the world is
characterized by six major themes: (1) faith in the
unconscious mind, (2) a vindication of the individual, (3)
a predilection for diversity, ambiguity, and imperfection,
(4) a preoccupation with qualities that are different,
remote, or mysterious in humans, (5) wonder and awe of
nature, and (6) a concern for humankind’s moral
characteristics. This author will proceed to identify these
romantic themes as they appear in Thomas’ discourse; the
themes’ strategic location, function, and rhetorical
significance will be assessed. In addition, the author will
examine the scientific world view as it is set against the
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romantic world view in Thomas’ overall rhetorical design. 
Thus, it will be shown how the scientific world view is 
symbolically merged with a romantic orientation in Thomas’ 
essays to create what in chapter two is described as a 
scientific-romantic synthesis.
Finally the rhetorical analyst, in this case, the 
author of this dissertation, also contributes to the act of 
analysis. That is, this analyst "conceives of himself as a 
kind of sensitive instrument," and will impose certain 
interpretive frameworks on the object under rhetorical 
scrutiny.80 For example, this author will draw upon his 
knowledge of science as well as information gathered from a 
literature review on the rhetoric of science and of 
cultural history to aid in the interpretation of Thomas’ 
writings. In general, this dissertation is consistent with 
the three-stage critical format outlined by Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell.
Campbell claims that descriptive analysis, the first 
stage in the critical process, is entirely intrinsic. In 
other words, the analyst focuses mainly upon the 
discourse, making "descriptive statements solely on the 
basis of the content of the discourse itself."81 In the 
same vein, the first stage of this author’s analysis will 
involve a close reading of Thomas’ essays, focusing 
primarily upon the language of the included essays.
Campbell states that in historical-contextual analysis,
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the second stage in the critical process, the rhetorical 
analyst "... acquires information about the historical- 
cultural context, the rhetorician, the audience, and the 
persuasive forces operating in the scene ...”82
Furthermore, Campbell asserts that "a discourse is the
rhetorician’s solution to a problem he perceives in a 
particular context, that is, the rhetorician’s attempt to 
encompass a situation."83 In similar manner, this 
dissertation profiles Thomas’ background as a scientist and 
examines how Thomas’ discourse operates within a particular 
context to respond to certain historical-cultural forces. 
More specifically, this author will analyze how Thomas’
popular scientific essays are crafted for the nonscientist, 
to make Thomas’ vision of science more palpable to the 
general public. In short, the author’s investigation will 
focus upon how Thomas, as a public scientist, responds to 
certain historical-cultural problems arising from the 
practice of science.
Finally, Campbell claims that interpretative analysis, 
the third stage in the critical process, focuses on the 
analyst, "reflecting his interests and biases."84 Campbell 
says that the analyst should use his intrinsic descriptive 
analysis, and investigation of the historical-cultural 
context, as standards for judgment in evaluating the 
quality, worth, and consequences of the discourse.85 In 
much the same fashion, this author will utilize an
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intrinsic analysis of the language Thomas uses to delineate 
certain romantic and scientific values. Information
acquired concerning the traditional controversy between 
science and humanism, and the general public’s perception 
of science will be used to aid the interpretative analysis. 
This dissertation utilizes an interpretive critical 
analysis, focusing primarily upon the language and message 
of Thomas' essays. This study is not effects centered, and 
thus makes no claim to offering a formal measure of public 
reaction to Thomas' essays. This study will speculate, 
however, about the effect Thomas’ message might have on 
different audiences. Particularly, the author will 
speculate about how the general public is likely to 
interpret Thomas' popular scientific essays and also
consider the effect Thomas’ discourse is likely to have on 
the continuing dialogue between scientists and humanists.
Ultimately, this author is of the view that the study 
of public discourse provides an important intellectual 
measure for evaluating the ideas, values, and aspirations 
of a particular culture. In sum, this author agrees with 
Ernest J. Wrage’s claim that "from the study of [public
discourse] may be gained additional knowledge about the 
growth of ideas, their currency and vitality, their
modifications under the impress of social requirements, and 
their eclipse by other ideas with different values."86
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Organization of Data 
The remaining four chapters of this dissertation will be 
arranged in the following fashion.
Chapter Two: This chapter analyzes essays from Lewis 
Thomas’ popular scientific discourse; an attempt is made to 
explicate two romantic themes: (1) faith in the unconscious 
mind, and (2) a preoccupation with qualities that are 
different, remote, or mysterious in humans. The chapter 
attempts to explain and evaluate the rhetorical impact 
these two themes have as part of the larger scientific- 
romantic synthesis reflected in Thomas' discourse.
Chapter Three: This chapter analyzes essays from Lewis
Thomas’ popular scientific discourse in an attempt to 
explicate two romantic themes: (1) a predilection for
diversity, ambiguity, and imperfection, and (2) a 
vindication of the individual. The chapter attempts to 
explain and evaluate the rhetorical impact these two themes 
have as part of the larger scientific-romantic synthesis 
reflected in Thomas’ discourse.
Chapter Four: This chapter analyzes essays from Thomas’ 
popular scientific discourse in an attempt to explicate two 
romantic theme: (1) wonder and awe of nature, and (2) a
concern for humankinds’ moral characteristics. The chapter 
attempts to explain and evaluate the rhetorical impact 
these two themes have as part of the larger scientific- 
romantic synthesis reflected in Thomas’ discourse.
34
Chapter Five: This chapter provides conclusions about
the rhetorical nature and effectiveness of the scientific- 
romantic synthesis as a method for (1) mediating the long 
standing controversy between science and humanism, (2) 
allaying the general public’s concerns over the potential 
ethical and moral implications of science. The author will 
examine how other scientists might respond to the version 
of science proffered by Thomas. The author will also 
speculate about why the popularization of science should be 
regarded as an aspect of rhetoric rather than exclusively 
or simply as an aspect of science or literature. Finally, 
chapter five will provide conclusions regarding how this 
dissertation’s research findings contribute to previous 
scholarship on public scientific communication. The author 
will suggest avenues for future research concerning 
romantic public science specifically, and public scientific 
communication generally.
Chapter Two
In chapter one it was suggested that Thomas’ essays 
reveal a union of traditional scientific values and 
popular romantic themes. This union shall be called here a 
"rhetorical synthesis." The term synthesis as it is used 
here has two defining characteristics. First, in a general 
sense, the word synthesis, used here synonymously with the 
words merger, orientation, and perspective, is understood 
as the "putting of two or more things together so as to 
form a whole."87 More specifically, the term synthesis is 
used to suggest a reconciliation of two philosophically 
opposing forces. Thomas' essays reflect a synthesis insofar 
as they merge what have traditionally been thought to be 
two opposing philosophical views of reality, science and 
romanticism. Second, this synergistic reconciliation of two 
opposing philosophical forces is understood to produce a 
third philosophical view of reality, which combines 
elements from the two original views of reality yet is a 
wholly separate, independent philosophical perspective. 
Thomas’ synthesis of traditional scientific values and 
popular romantic themes produces a particularly humane 
version of science. The synthesis reflected in Thomas’ 
essays is rhetorical insofar as it depends on the strategic 
use of language to attempt a reconciliation between science
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and romanticism, and is purposefully designed to produce a 
romantic science capable mitigating the long-standing 
dispute between science and humanism and to allay the 
public’s fear about the social consequences of science. The 
degree to which Thomas may succeed or fails in this 
rhetorical synthesis shall be a topic for discussion in the 
final chapter of this dissertation.
Two themes which are consistently found in definitions 
of romanticism are faith in the unconscious mind, and an 
emphasis on qualities that are different, remote, or 
mysterious in humans. These two core romantic tenets serve 
as the romantic axiology undergirding much of Thomas’ 
discourse. The rhetorical function of these themes in the 
construction and justification of Thomas’ scientific- 
romantic synthesis will be explored. The author will also 
examine how the rhetorical merger enables Thomas to 
articulate a vision that accommodates the general public’s 
increasing apprehension about the social consequences of 
science, while simultaneously maintaining science’s 
privileged status in society. Finally, ways in which the 
rhetorical synthesis allows Thomas to recognize that the 
aims of science and humanism may be compatible are 
investigated.
Scientific Rationality Vs. Romance 
Early modern science, beginning with Copernicus and 
Galileo, claimed to have discovered a series of natural
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laws that uniformly applied to the cosmos; from these laws 
was derived a mechanical philosophy that conceived the 
cosmos as a static mechanism (a perfectly running machine 
is the most common metaphor of this mechanistic 
philosophy). Moreover, there existed in modern science an 
intimate connection between the mechanical philosophy and 
faith in rationality.88
Twentieth century science has moved beyond an orthodox 
mechanical philosophy to a more sophisticated view of the 
cosmos. Scientists no longer use the machine as a heuristic 
model to explain the nature of the universe, but, as 
Eichner argued, "the basic heuristic assumption of science 
is still that the phenomena of the world are causally 
determined in conformity with the laws of nature."89 
Furthermore contemporary science, unlike romanticism, is 
still characterized by an allegiance to rationality; 
scientists typically believe that "all things are possible 
to reason in the form of a high developed science."90 
Philosophical debates over the nature of rationality not­
withstanding, the most significant part of the scientific 
ethos as constituted by scientists is the rationalistic 
attitude which supports their practice. In fact, a number 
of scholars have attempted to explain the importance of 
rationality to the scientific ethos. In The Sociology of 
Science. Robert K. Merton sought to identify the complex of 
values and norms that inform the scientific enterprise.
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Merton argued that the value of organized skepticism 
instructs the scientist to temporarily suspend judgment in 
order to scrutinize beliefs against empirical and logical 
criteria.91 In Science and the Social Order. Bernard 
Barber states that "science exists only when rational 
thought is applied to ... empirical ends."92 In Science as 
a Cultural process. Maurice N. Richter Jr. contends that 
scientific methods rely on "quantified observations under 
controlled conditions" to acquire systematic knowledge of 
the natural order.93 In "Science as a Rhetorical 
Transaction: Toward a Nonjustificational Conception of
Rhetoric," Walter Weimer asserts that logic became an 
essential tenet of traditional scientific method in 
"inference ... assessment, and explanation."94 In short, 
while twentieth century science is closer than nineteenth 
century science to romanticism in its philosophical 
commitment to organicism, major differences between these 
two movements remain.
The romantic movement, in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, reacted against the spirit and 
implications of the scientific episteme which preceded it; 
for many poets and philosophers, romanticism replaced the 
mechanical philosophy associated with modern science with 
an organic reality model. Romantic organicism assumed that 
humans perceive truth in nature, not through rational 
investigation of natural phenomena, but through the
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unconscious and creative mind. In essence, organicism 
assumes a cosmos decidedly more complicated than the one 
described by mechanistic science. The romantic epistemology 
rejected mechanistic science’s assumption that the universe 
is permanent, never changing, and operates in principle 
like a perfect machine. To the contrary, romanticism 
posited a cosmos that is "living and growing, not a perfect 
machine."9 5
For those in literature and philosophy for whom 
organicism replaced the mechanical philosophy, the power of 
humans’ unconscious and creative imagination, rather than 
reason, became the accepted way to higher truths. In fact, 
scholars have documented the predominance of imagination 
over reason in the romantic value system. For example, 
Peckham has argued that for the romantic reason is 
inadequate:
... truth can only be apprehended intuitively, 
imaginatively ... from the deep sources of the 
fountains that are within. The unconscious is 
really a postulate to the creative imagination 
... It is that part of the mind through which 
novelty enters into the personality and hence 
into the world in the form of art and ideas.96
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy references the romantic 
movement’s "exaltation of intuition, spirit, sensibility, 
imagination, faith, the unmeasurable, and the infinite."97 
Eichner suggests that the Romantic poet or philosopher 
never wholly rejected reason, but assigned it only menial 
services. To attain higher truths Romantics relied on the
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"irrational faculties of the mind... unmediated insight ... 
intellectual intuition, and the imagination."98 The Norton 
Anthology of English Literature added that the romantic
philosophy emphasised "the free activity of the
imagination ... and the feelings of the heart to supplement 
the judgments of the purely logical faculty."99
Another popular theme manifested in the romantic
epistemology is an interest in the remote, the mysterious,
the unknown. In Rhetoric. Romance, and Technology: Studies
in Interaction and Culture. Walter Ong notes that
definitions of romanticism invariable include reference to
mysterious phenomena:
... whatever way one defines [romanticism], one of 
the movement’s characteristics— more or less 
central depending on the particular definition— a 
preoccupation with otherness, with what is 
different, remote, mysterious, inaccessible, 
exotic, even bizarre.100
Virtually all scholarship, according to Ong, falls back on
this theme to distinguish the romantic movement from the
neoclassicism which preceded it.
The popular scientific essays of Lewis Thomas 
celebrate these two core romantic tenets. They may be 
explicitly stated as: (1) a faith in the unconscious mind 
and the creative imagination, and (2) a preoccupation with 
qualities that are different, remote, or mysterious in 
humans. Thomas merges these two themes with an emphasis on 
scientific rationality to produce a scientific-romantic 
orientation toward the human mind and natural phenomena.
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Thomas on the Unconscious Mind and Rationality 
In "The Attic of the Brain," Thomas draws a 
metaphorical relationship between the attic of a house and 
the human unconscious. The attic is a "mysterious space" 
serving as the memory of a house, "filled with
unidentifiable articles too important to be thrown out ... 
but no longer suitable to have at hand."101 A modern house 
or apartment, however, rarely includes an attic. Today 
whenever we "grow tired of a memory, an old chair, a 
trunkful of old letters, they are carted off to the dump 
for burning."102 Thomas suggests that the human unconscious 
serves as a comfortable part of the mind, much like an
attic to a house, "to hide away the things we'd like to
keep but at the same time forget."103 His primary argument 
is that modern psychiatry has erred in its attempt to
expose the darkest recesses of the human unconscious, and 
its efforts to demystify the so called "functionless, 
untidy, inexplicable" notions of the unconscious mind 
should be abated. Much like a romantic, who would highlight 
the essence of what it means to be human, Thomas asserts 
that "it is in our nature as human beings" to retain a 
proportion of thought in our unconscious.104 In fact, 
Thomas welcomes the mystery of the unconscious mind, and 
encourages the repression of certain thoughts and dreams. 
He understands that through their unconscious minds humans 
remain in possession of a vital aspect of their humanity:
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... [they] regain the kind of spontaneity and zest 
for ideas, things popping into the mind, 
uncontrollable and ungovernable thoughts, the feel 
that this notion is somehow connected 
unaccountably with that one. We could again come 
into possession of real memory, the kind of memory 
that can come only from forgotten furniture, old 
photographs, fragments of music.105
This quote is revealing. The romantic epistemology puts
great faith in the spontaneity and intuition of the
unconscious. Thus, Thomas' willingness to protect the
sanctity of the unconscious against scientific probing is
in keeping with the romantic tradition. Science, on the
other hand, relies on the rational mind, is methodical, and
does not "feel" that two ideas are somehow connected
unaccountably. Rather, science searches for causal
connections, or statistical correlations, in nature, and
attempts to prove, through experimentation and the
accumulation of evidence, that two ideas are related.
Thomas' belief in the ability of the unconscious to put
humans in "possession of real memory" also underscores what
is perhaps romanticism’s quintessential criticism of
science: science relies strictly on humans’ logical faculty
and therefore cannot recognize the significance of human
emotion. The human unconscious, however, has the
inexplicable ability to understand that emotions are
triggered by items such as "... forgotten furniture, old
photographs [and] fragments of music."106 A person’s
emotions may, as Thomas' suggests, invoke a recollection of
events, people, or places in his or her past, in a manner
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that rational recollection cannot. In other words, a
recollection triggered by emotion might unexplainably, even
mysteriously, provide a person with insight into his or her
personality or being, in a way that science and the power
of rational thought cannot. Thomas understands that
psychiatry’s effort to "straighten out and tidy up" the
human unconscious may be "one of the great errors of our
time." He suggests that the unconscious mind should remain
free from the influence of rational thought:
The [unconscious mind] is not meant to be 
governed ... it is supposed to run itself, and 
[humans] are obliged to follow it along, trying to 
keep up the best [they] can. It is all very well 
[for humans] to be aware of [their] 
awareness ... but never try to operate it.107
Thomas admits that he is not sure what the unconscious is
built to contain. Yet as a biologist he believes "the
unconscious [mind] ... should be regarded as [a] normal
[structure], installed wherever [it is] for a purpose."108
Thomas would take for granted that the unconscious is a
"useful, probably indispensable organ of thought."109
This essay illustrates Thomas' romantic-scientific 
orientation toward the unconscious. On the one hand, as a 
biologist, he relies on a rational scientific perspective 
which assumes that all natural phenomena can be explained, 
and these phenomena serve a useful function in the 
perfectly ordered universe. Particularly, Thomas claims to 
be "impressed by the usefulness of everything alive," and 
suggests that the unconscious, though presently beyond the
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scope of scientific understanding, is likely to serve a 
useful function in human psychology. As a romantic, on the 
other hand, Thomas fears that science’s effort to unravel 
the mystery of the unconscious may eventually destroy the 
essence of human psychology. Specifically, he views the 
unconscious as "a mysterious apparatus," whose continued 
exposure to the rational exploration of psychiatry might 
cause humans to "lose, ultimately, the marvelous conviction 
that being human is the best thing to b e ." In summary, he 
seems to be saying that to reduce the mind to the status of 
machine removes a sense of individuality and mystery from 
that organ which we take to be the center of our being. 
Thus, Thomas understands that the unconscious mind 
represents a distinguishing and perhaps essential element 
of the human species.
In "Humanities and Science" Thomas admonishes science 
to respect the integrity of the human mind in a 
characteristically romantic fashion, and distinguishes 
science from technology in order to defend science’s 
primary purpose of gaining a comprehensive knowledge of 
nature.
In this essay Thomas refrains from drawing a 
distinction between the unconscious and the rational mind. 
Nevertheless, he manifests a romantic disposition when 
claiming to be "made nervous by assertions that human 
consciousness will someday be unraveled by research, laid
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out for close scrutiny like the workings of a computer..."
Moreover, Thomas is "deeply disturbed by any prospect that
[science] might use the new knowledge in order to" improve
consciousness. In a romantic vein, he proclaims that "the
... human mind is too marvelous an instrument ever to be
tampered with by anyone, science or no science."110
Notwithstanding, Thomas defends science’s aim to gain a
comprehensive knowledge of nature even while he maintains a
romantic disposition toward the human mind. He defends
scientific discovery of new information about nature (eg.,
human psychology) by assuming a fundamental difference
between science and technology:
Technology relies and depends on science ... but 
is nothing like the first justification for doing 
research, nor is it necessarily an essential 
product to be expected from science. Public 
decisions about ... technology are ... different 
from decisions about science, and the two 
enterprises should not be [confused]. The central 
task of science is to arrive...at a clearer 
comprehension of nature, but this does not 
mean ... a search for mastery over nature.111
These remarks provide rationale for the claimed merger of
romantic and scientific values in Thomas’ philosophical
orientation to the human mind. His distinction between
science and technology accommodates both a scientific and
romantic disposition toward human consciousness. As a
scientist, Thomas suggests that the sole motivation of
science is to understand nature, not alter it. He argues
that science, as an enterprise distinct from technology,
should not be held responsible for technological
46
application of scientific research that attempts to control 
human consciousness. In other words, Thomas is suggesting 
that, unlike technologists who might seek to alter and 
control the human mind, scientists are simply motivated to 
comprehend how the mind operates. Thus, in addition to 
defending scientific research, Thomas' distinction between 
science and technology also echoes a romantic perspective; 
that is, much like a romantic, Thomas is opposed to 
technology that would alter human consciousness; he seems 
to suggest that technological intervention into the 
mysteriousness of the human mind would attempt to strip the 
individual of his or her uniqueness.
In "On Warts" Thomas offers a discussion of warts as 
one "of the great mystifications of science," and is 
particularly interested in the way "warts can be ordered 
off the skin by [the] hypnotic suggestion" of the 
unconscious. He is also astonished that the unconscious can 
rid the body of a virus with the apparent permanence and 
toughness of a wart. As a scientist, Thomas was trained to 
regard the unconscious as an impediment to rational
thought:
... as a sort of private sanitarium walled off
somewhere in a suburb of [the human] brain,
capable only of producing such garbled information 
as to keep [the mind], [the] proper mind, always a 
little off balance.112
Within the scope of Thomas' scientific training the
"proper" mind and the rational mind appear to be
synonymous; as a scientist, he has been trained to put
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complete trust in the powers of the rational mind, and to 
view the unconscious as capable only of producing "garbled 
information." This traditional scientific perspective views 
the unconscious as a hindrance, serving to keep the 
rational mind "a little off balance." In spite of his 
scientific training, however, Thomas’ recognition of the 
potential of the unconscious reveals a romantic strain: the 
apparent ability of the unconscious to reject a wart is 
proof, for Thomas, that the unconscious mind "is not the 
sort of confused, disordered" mechanism science has 
traditionally depicted.113
Nevertheless, Thomas’ romantic disposition toward the
unconscious is delimited, for he attributes rational
characteristics to the unconscious. Thus, he deviates from
an exclusively romantic conviction in the inexplicable
potential of the unconscious. In other words, Thomas is
only partially willing to let the mysterious nature of the
unconscious stand as an explanation for its
"superintelligence." Instead, as one might expect from a
scientist, Thomas ascribes qualities of the rational mind
to the human unconscious. For example, he explains that the
unconscious has a superintelligence "infinitely smarter and
possessed of technical know-how far beyond" science’s
present understanding:
The unconscious has ... the accuracy and precision 
of a surgeon. There almost has to be a person in 
charge, running matters of meticulous detail 
beyond anyone’s comprehension, a skilled engineer
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and manager, a chief executive officer...among 
other accomplishments he must be a cell biologist 
of world class . ,.114
These remarks suggest that the unconscious is endowed with
a problem solving capability equal to that of a surgeon, a
skilled engineer, a chief executive officer, or a cell
biologist. These professions are, of course, typically
noted for their reliance on human rational judgment.
In summary, Thomas is neither a pure romantic nor a 
pure scientist in his view of the unconscious. Like a 
romantic, Thomas recognizes that, far from constraining the 
rational mind, the unconscious possesses a mysterious 
intelligence; unlike the pure romantic, however, he is not 
satisfied to revel in the mystery of the unconscious 
without speculating about the nature and source of its 
intellectual capability. His propensity to ground the 
intellectual capability of the unconscious in rational 
activity is significantly different from the mysterious 
characteristics a romantic might posit (e.g., spontaneity, 
intuition, unmediated insight). Thus, while he differs from 
the traditional scientific perspective in his unwillingness 
to view the unconscious as an impediment to rational 
thought, Thomas does maintain a qualified allegiance to the 
scientific ethos.
The three essays chosen for examination herein 
exemplify the merger of romantic and scientific values 
reflected in Thomas’ attitude toward the human unconscious.
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The nature of this rhetorical merger is characterized by 
the ambiguous philosophical middle ground it achieves 
between science and romanticism. Carole Tallant has 
provided a discussion on the theory and practice of 
narrative ambiguity that aids understanding of how 
ambiguity operates as a rhetorical device in Thomas’
persuasive merger.115 According to Tallant, ambiguity was 
not generally recognized as a valuable artistic device 
until 1930 and the publication of William Empson's Seven 
Types of Ambiguity.116 Tallant notes that unlike past
scholars, who identified ambiguity as a lack of clarity, 
Empson defines ambiguity broadly as "any verbal nuance, 
however slight, which gives room for alternative reactions 
to the same piece of language."117 Tallant explains that 
Empson’s view of ambiguity is valuable for the manner in 
which it enlarges the reader’s understanding of more 
complex meanings in language, yet has received criticism 
within the scholarly community for perpetuating a 
definition that "reduces the precision of critical 
terminology."118 Thus, in an effort to provide a more 
precise definition, Tallant’s study suggests classifying 
ambiguity as either conjunctive or disjunctive. From
Tallant’s perspective, conjunctive ambiguity operates when 
"two or more meanings arise and complement each other so 
that the reader need not choose between them."119
Disjunctive ambiguity operates when "the two meanings
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mutually exclude each other but are equally tenable. Thus 
the reader cannot choose."120 For present purposes, 
Tallant*s definition of conjunctive ambiguity illuminates 
the manner in which ambiguity functions as a rhetorical 
device in Thomas' scientific-romantic synthesis. 
Specifically, Thomas' romantic science is characterized by
an ambiguous philosophical middle ground between science 
and romanticism, so that these two views, traditionally 
thought to be in opposition, appear to complement each 
other's perspective of reality. For example, Thomas’
perspective on the unconscious mind, neither purely 
romantic nor purely scientific, relies for its rhetorical 
force on an ambiguous equivocation between the two 
perspectives. In essence, Thomas uses ambiguity
strategically to foster more than one viewpoint; 
paradoxically, ambiguity serves as a rhetorical tactic in 
his essays to promote unified diversity between scientific 
and romantic perspectives concerning the unconscious.121 In 
other words, Thomas’ equivocal view of the unconscious 
seems designed to maintain the philosophical integrity of 
both science and romanticism, while simultaneously
accommodating the long standing differences between these 
two modes of thought.
In "The Attic of the Brain," for example, Thomas 
recommends that psychiatry refrain from its attempts to 
expose all aspects of the unconscious to rational
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exploration. He understands that the unconscious’ 
spontaneity and intuitiveness may provide humans with the 
capacity to respond emotionally, as opposed to merely 
rationally, to environmental stimuli. Thomas suggests, 
ultimately, that emotional experience may provide a person 
with clues to his or her individuality and to what it means 
to be human.
In "Humanities and Science," Thomas draws a 
distinction between the aims of science and those of 
technology, explaining that the sole aim of scientific 
research is to gain comprehensive knowledge about nature, 
while technology attempts mastery over nature. Thomas’ 
distinction between scientific and technological 
perspectives on nature seems designed, from a scientific 
viewpoint, to advance science’s understanding of how the 
mind operates. On the other hand, his opposition to 
technology that harnesses scientific research to control 
nature, and particularly the human mind, supports a 
romantic disposition.
In "On Warts" Thomas recognizes that the unconscious 
has a mysterious, and perhaps in the short-term 
inexplicable, intellectual ability to remove warts. Yet 
unlike a romantic, Thomas is not satisfied to rejoice in 
the unconscious’ mysterious ability for its own sake. 
Rather, echoing a scientific perspective, Thomas speculates 
about how the unconscious might operate in the removal of
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warts: he explains that an understanding of the
instructions issued by the unconscious mind in the removal 
of warts is "... a wonderful problem, in need of 
s o l v i n g . 22
The merger of romantic and scientific values reflected 
in his attitude toward the human unconscious is an 
important part of the larger scientific-romantic synthesis 
found in Thomas’ public science. As such, the rhetorical 
impact of this merger deserves evaluation in respect to 
three research questions proposed in chapter one: Might the 
merger of romantic and scientific values reflected in the 
language Thomas uses to discuss the human unconscious, as 
part of the larger scientific-romantic synthesis embodied 
in his writings, (1) mediate the traditional dichotomy 
between science and humanism? (2) mitigate the general 
public’s apprehension about the social consequences of 
science? and (3) highlight the general public’s capacity to 
respond to aspects of the world inaccessible to the 
interpretive framework of science and ordinary rational 
thought?
The equivocation between scientific and romantic 
values reflected in Thomas’ orientation to the human 
unconscious provides a rhetorical middle ground capable of 
mitigating the long standing controversy between science 
and humanism. Humanists, eager to defend self-realization 
of the human personality, should welcome Thomas’ implicit
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recognition that the human unconscious complements the 
rational mind in exploring areas of experience presently 
inaccessible to science; humanists may find hope in Thomas’ 
perception of the unconscious as a sensitive organ of 
thought, capable of triggering human emotion, and 
potentially valuable for its aesthetic capacity to 
understand "human" truths too profound for the rational 
mind to comprehend. Scientists, on the other hand, may find 
satisfaction in Thomas* professed allegiance to science’s 
primary goal of gaining a comprehensive knowledge about 
nature. Thomas* willingness to learn more about the actual 
mechanics of the unconscious mind is also consistent with 
the scientific world view. Scientists may, however, dismiss 
Thomas* inclination to invest the unconscious with 
mysterious superintelligence. The scientific perspective is 
likely to be uncomfortable with the word "mysterious" as a 
descriptive term for the intellectual ability of the 
unconscious. More specifically, from a scientific 
perspective, Thomas* use of the word mysterious may come 
unacceptably close to ascribing transcendental qualities to 
the unconscious. Science, of course, would assert that 
ultimate physical reality is knowable; it would assert the 
primacy of the empirical and the material over the 
spiritual. Thus, science is likely to view its limited 
understanding of the unconscious as temporary, remaining 
confident in its search for empirical information aimed at
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providing a more complete naturalistic understanding of 
brain processes.
Embedded within Thomas’ attempt to distinguish science 
from technology is an implicit argument designed to divorce 
the scientific enterprise from its consequences. Thomas 
suggests, for example, that the general public should 
support scientific efforts to learn more about the human 
unconscious. In this way, science might understand the 
nature of the unconscious mind’s reaction to certain 
diseases. Yet Thomas argues against technological 
application of scientific research that might alter or 
control the unconscious. Thus, his distinction between 
science and technology seems a rhetorical attempt to 
respond both to science’s appetite for knowledge and to the 
general public’s apprehension about scientific exploration 
of the unconscious mind. Ultimately, while Thomas’ 
artificial distinction between science and technology may 
obtain among scientists in a laboratory, it appears tenuous 
and lacks credibility when set forth in the public arena. 
The general public is, after all, well aware of instances 
where scientific research was used to develop technologies 
which were ultimately harmful to humankind. They are 
therefore likely, along with humanists, to remain 
apprehensive about science's continued exploration into the 
human unconscious.
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Finally, Thomas’ scientific-romantic approach to the 
unconscious mind underscores the general public’s capacity 
to respond to aspects of the world inaccessible to the 
interpretive framework of science and rational thought. His 
recognition of the unconscious’ capacity for problem 
solving and aesthetic experience encourages laypersons to 
depend on intuitive and emotional judgment along with 
logical processes for problem solving. This dependence may 
result in a more well balanced and complete utilization of 
an individual’s intellectual resources. A more accurate 
self-appraisal may, perhaps, provide a person with 
valuable information about his or her personality, along 
with a deeper understanding about what it means to be 
human.
Thomas on the Mysterious and the Naturalistic
This chapter also attempts to explain and evaluate the 
rhetorical impact of a second romantic theme evidenced in 
Thomas’ public scientific writings: a preoccupation with 
qualities that are different, remote, or mysterious in 
humans.
Science has traditionally criticised the pretensions 
of superstition and pseudoscience, choosing instead to 
explain human existence in terms of naturalistic 
explanation, without recourse to mysterious or 
unaccountable forces. For example, in Permanence and Change
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Kenneth Burke notes science's general skepticism of
nonscientific methods of explanation:
The mystics are condemned for failing to abide by 
established canons of positivistic
science ... there are certain fixed Marquis of 
Queensbury rules for scientific combat, and anyone 
who would turn his skepticism against these vested 
interests of scientific rationalization is 
suspected of a hankering to sink back into the 
Dark Ages of human thought.123
Romanticism, though, is typically preoccupied with
"otherness, with what is different, remote, mysterious,
inaccessible, exotic, even bizarre.124 Lewis Thomas’
recognition of ineffable and remote aspects of human
existence is best exemplified in his essays on the creative
imagination and on music.
The idea of the creative imagination, according to 
Peckham, is derived from dynamic organicism. "If the 
universe is constantly changing in the process of creating 
itself, the mind of man, his imaginative power, is 
radically creative."125 In "An Apology" Thomas offers a 
wry, ironic, even humorous, juxtaposition of science and 
the creative imagination’s ability to shape reality. He 
explains that in modern physics "the observer, and his 
apparatus, create the reality to be observed ... The 
reality to be studied by [the physicist’s] instruments is 
not simply there; it is brought into existence by the 
laboratory."126 Thomas claims to have "been doing some 
physical observing on [his] own, without formal training 
and with only a pencil point as instrument ,.."127
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Specifically, Thomas has imagined that by holding a pencil
point in the middle of "a yellow lined pad" he can make
"the sun revolve" around his office in New York:
It takes a bit of heaving to get it started, but 
after a few minutes of hard thought you can hold 
East Sixty-ninth Street as the still, central 
point, and then you can feel the sun rolling up 
behind you ... making the great circle around. 
Once you’ve got the sun started, it is not too 
difficult to organize the rest of the solar 
system, so that the whole apparatus is ... 
spinning around the central point on the upper 
East Side of Manhattan . ..128
Thomas is concerned about the effect his imaginative power
may "have had on the cosmologists, who may be looking at
things in Pasadena, or Puerto Rico, or Palomar, or
Pittsburgh, or wherever."129 Thomas adds that his
"manipulations may not be the only ones going on." Other
individuals may be using their imaginative ability to swing
the universe from its normal course. Finally, Thomas admits
to being very sorry for having tampered with the universe,
but claims that he cannot be sure of stopping:
Once you have held the pencil point with all that 
precision, on a single fine point, and swing the 
whole whistling universe around that point, 
shrinking celestial masses of matter to nothing at 
all in the necessary speed, feeling the whole 
thing yaw and heave and almost spin off beyond 
control, but still holding it there, spinning, it 
is hard to stop.130
Thomas does not intend readers to accept the notion that
he, or anyone else, has the ability "with only a pencil
point as instrument" to shape a particular reality: any
literal interpretation of this essay would miss the
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rhetorical significance of Thomas' reflections. More 
appropriately, Thomas' view of the creative imagination is 
best characterised as intentionally enigmatic. Moreover, 
the perplexity of his thoughts seems designed precisely to 
signify the mysteriousness of the human imagination. Thus, 
Thomas has effected a rhetorical merger of romantic and 
scientific values: he has recognized simultaneously the
scientist's ability to shape reality and the romantic's 
high esteem for the imagination’s creative function. In 
short, Thomas has persuasively suggested that the creative 
imagination may be as powerful as modern physics in its 
ability to construct reality.
Thomas’ essays on music also reflect an even more 
romantic preoccupation with remote or mysterious aspects of 
human existence. Thomas indicates that music’s ability to 
evoke emotion may be inextricably linked to the human 
thought process; he typically identifies the connection 
between music and human psychology as a mysterious aspect 
of human nature. Thomas’ recognition of music’s potential 
to spark human emotion is not a revelation. In fact, a 
number of scholars have referred to the influence of music 
in producing aesthetic experience. In The Psychology of 
Music: The Influence of Music on Behavior. Charles M. 
Diserens and Harry Fine note that language is intimately 
connected with human emotion:
Music is a form of language ... older than
articulate speech ... it is the speech of the
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antique, half buried soul of the race ... In music
man may dimly revive the most ancient elements and
experiences in the history of the soul ... In 
short, music is the language of the emotions.131
In Esthetics of Music. Carl Dahlhus explains that knowledge
of the ability of music "to represent and arouse affections
is a commonplace, rooted ... deeply in history."132 He adds
that "music acts directly on ... the listener’s emotions,
passions, and affections, quickly elevating or even
transforming them ...133" In Music the Art and Ideas:
Patterns and Predictions in Twentieth Century Culture.
Leonard B. Meyer claims that human emotion arising out of
music is as important as emotion emanating from language:
Music may be meaningful because it refers to 
things outside itself, evoking associations and 
connotations relative to the world of ideas, 
sentiments, and physical objects. Such designative 
meanings are often less precise and specific than 
those arising in linguistic communication. This 
does not, however, make them less forceful or 
significant.13 4
Thomas, too, recognizes music's intimate nexus with 
creative imagination, along with its concomitant potential 
to arouse human emotion. Moreover, his recognition of 
music’s ability to heighten human awareness may be a more 
persuasive topos than simply acknowledging the ways in 
which rational, empirical data enhance perception. In "Late 
Night Thoughts on Mahler’s Ninth Symphony," for example, 
Thomas experiences melancholy as a result of a perceived 
association between the mood evoked in Mahler’s Ninth 
Symphony and the threat of "thermonuclear bombs exploding"
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throughout the world. Thomas’ use of this type of aesthetic
experience as a rhetorical warning against thermonuclear
war is more typical of the poet or novelist than the
scientist. For instance, Thomas used to hear Mahler’s Ninth
Symphony as recognition of nature’s natural order:
as an open acknowledgement of death and at the 
same time a quiet celebration of the tranquillity 
connected with the process. [He] took this music 
as a metaphor for reassurance... that the dying of 
every living creature, the most natural of all 
experiences, has to be a peaceful experience. [He 
relied] on nature.133
The cruel reality of thermonuclear weapons, however, in the
form of government brochures and television newscasts,
constantly impinges on Thomas’ consciousness. He talks, for
example, of a pamphlet on his desk, "published by the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment ..." This
document discusses strategies for "placement and
protection" of MX missiles, "each capable of creating
artificial suns to vaporize a hundred Hiroshimas,
collectively capable of destroying the life on any
continent."136 At another point in his essay, Thomas claims
to listen to a "man on television" explain the advantages
of civilian defense:
Instead of the outright death of eighty million 
American citizens in twenty minutes...we can, by 
careful planning and practice, get the number down 
to only forty million, maybe even twenty ... of 
course [the man] adds, [the Russians] have the 
capacity to kill all two hundred and twenty 
million of us if they were to try real hard.137
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Daily reminders of this type have shaken Thomas’ confidence 
in the continuity of life; he is not as certain as he once 
was that humanity will survive into the Twenty-first 
century. Thomas can no longer listen to the Mahler Ninth 
"without a door-smashing new thought: death everywhere, the 
dying of everything, the end of humanity." Mahler’s 
symphony no longer comes to Thomas as "old, familiar news 
of the cycle of living and dying." All through the last 
notes Thomas* mind swarms with images of a world in which 
thermonuclear bombs have begun to explode, "in New York and 
San Francisco, in Moscow and Leningrad, in Paris...In 
Oxford and Cambridge, in Edinburgh."138 Thus, Thomas now 
listens to the Mahler Ninth as a meditation on death.139 
The influence of music in producing states of melancholy or 
pleasure is, of course, in a strict sense, tangential to 
the scientific-romantic synthesis. More importantly, 
music’s emotional impact, along with its ability to sharpen 
human perception, is precisely the type of mysterious 
phenomenon a romantic would accentuate. Thomas’ public 
science, then, persuasively merges aesthetic and rational 
perspectives on the power of music and empirical data to 
emphasize the gravity of thermonuclear weapons.
The romantic theme of music’s mysterious nature and 
inexplicable link to human psychology is not unique to 
"Late Night Thoughts on Mahler's Ninth Symphony." This 
theme is considered in a number of Thomas* essays. In "On
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Thinking About Thinking," for example, he offers a
speculative, quasi-scientific, explanation of the stages in
the development of human thought. This exposition about the
"nature of thought" is intended to illuminate the "nature
of music." In the end, Thomas is not satisfied with this
approach and decides instead to determine what music might
reveal about the sensation of thought:
Music is the effort we make to explain to our­
selves how our brains work. We listen to Bach 
transfixed because this is listening to a 
human mind. The Art of the Fugue is not a 
special pattern of thinking ... the whole piece 
is not about thinking about something, it is 
about thinking ... If you want, as an
experiment, to hear the whole mind working, all 
at once, put on the St Matthew Passion and turn 
the volume way up . ..140
Thomas’ impression that music represents human thought
patterns suggests a mystic union of the mind with music’s
transcendental or mysterious reality. This type of romantic
mysticism is evident also in Thomas’ "The Corner of the
Eye." His discussion of certain notes in a Bach fugue leads
to the conclusion that "The real meaning of music comes
from tones only audible in the corner of the mind."141 In
"Ceti" Thomas ruminates about how humans might best
represent themselves to "others in space:"
... music would give a fairer picture of what we 
are really like than some other things we might 
be sending [into space] ... we could send science 
... but think of the wincing at this end when the 
polite comments arrive two hundred years from now. 
Whatever we offer as today’s items of liveliest 
interest are bound to be out of date and irrele­
vant, maybe even ridiculous. I think we should 
stick to music.142
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Hence, Thomas suggests that music may be humans’ most
representative characteristic. In fact, Thomas indicates in
"The Music of this Sphere" that humans may be genetically
coded for music:
The need to make music, and to listen to 
it, is universally expressed by human beings 
I cannot imagine, even in our most primitive 
times, the emergence of talented painters to 
make cave paintings without there having been, 
near at hand, equally creative people making 
song. [Music] is ... a dominant aspect of human 
biology.14 3
The merger of romantic and scientific values reflected 
in his orientation toward mysterious or remote aspects of 
human existence is a component in the larger scientific- 
romantic synthesis evidenced in Thomas’ writings. As such, 
the persuasive impact of this merger is examined in regard 
to two research questions set forth in this dissertation: 
Might the rhetorical merger of romantic and scientific 
values reflected in Thomas’ attitude toward the imagination 
and music (1) mediate the traditional dichotomy between 
science and humanism, and (2) provide the general public a 
greater role in establishing criteria for judgment for 
private and public decision-making?
Thomas’ perspective on creative imagination and music 
as mysterious aspects of human existence may help mitigate 
the controversy between science and humanism in two ways. 
First, Thomas’ recognition of the mind's imaginative power 
implicitly reveals a sort of sensitivity, emotionalism, and 
eagerness for novelty characteristic of romanticism.
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Thomas, while not seeking to dethrone rationalism, does 
revolt against the dullness, narrowness, and literal 
mindedness that rationalism is, at worst, capable of 
producing. Humanists may be satisfied with Thomas’ 
rhetorical perspective on creative imagination and music as 
mysterious aspects of human existence. Scientists, on the 
other hand, may welcome Thomas’ overt reference to
science’s ability to shape reality. Moreover, while perhaps 
not content with Thomas’ thoughts on creative imagination, 
scientists may find a certain satisfaction in the witty, 
humorous tone with which these ruminations are offered. 
Indeed Thomas seems to be using the rhetorical strategy of 
valorizing music over scientific data by offering a mock 
insult of science. This insult recognizes and valorizes the 
underlying assumption of scientists that all of their
knowledge may potentially be subject to modification or 
even become obsolete as they discover new knowledge. 
Furthermore, scientists may find a pleasant irony in
Thomas* employment of a rational voice to highlight mystic 
experience.
Second, humanists may welcome Thomas’ persuasive
recognition of music’s essential connection with human 
thought patterns, along with its accompanying ability to 
incite emotion. This perspective suggests that music may 
potentially stimulate associations that correspond to 
objects in the natural world. In other words, music may
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have the ability to heighten one's sense of reality. This 
power may be derivative of the creative imagination, 
transcending intellect and ordinary logical processes. 
Scientists, however, may be uncomfortable with Thomas’ near 
mystical description of nature, assuming, as they do, that 
reality is knowable. Thus, the scientist would attempt to 
offer a naturalistic account of so called mystical 
experience.
Thomas’ preoccupation with mysterious phenomena 
provides the general public a greater role in establishing 
criterion for judgment in private and public decision­
making. The romantic mysticism evident in Thomas* public 
science suggests that there are certain aspects of human 
existence inaccessible to science. These facets, by virtue 
of remaining outside of science’s grasp, give the general 
public an increased confidence to evaluate certain matters, 
independent of science. In other words, the individual 
layperson comes to the recognition that science is 
incapable of providing a complete explanation of 
humankind’s position in the universe. Consequently, Thomas 
provides the way for an individual to turn to other forms 
of authority or aids for judgment in both private and 
public decision-making, such as theological explanation. 
In addition, Thomas clears the path for issues of morality 
to be given a more significant voice in public deliberation 
of scientific or technical information. In short, Thomas’
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merger of romantic mysticism and scientific rationality 
encourages the public to adapt a more circumspect view of 
the expert advice of scientists and technologists. And this 
synthesis, finally, provides a less constricted, more 
sophisticated view of what it means to be rational.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified two popular romantic themes 
in Lewis Thomas’ public science: faith in the unconscious 
mind, and a predilection for mysterious aspects of human 
existence. The chapter assessed the way these two themes 
are developed in essays selected to illuminate these themes 
and the way they are merged with scientific rationality to 
produce a vision of popular science, capable of mediating 
the old controversy between science and humanism. In 
addition, it examined the persuasive impact this 
scientific-romantic synthesis might have in mitigating the 
general public’s apprehension about the social consequences 
of science. Chapter three will proceed to identify and 
evaluate two more popular romantic themes evident in the 
larger scientific-romantic synthesis that serves as an 
underlying axiology of Thomas' writings.
Chapter Three
Chapter two contains the argument that the popular 
scientific essays of Lewis Thomas merge two central 
romantic tenets--faith in the unconscious mind, and a high 
evaluation of qualities that are different, remote, or 
mysterious in humans— with scientific rationality to 
produce a scientific-romantic synthesis. It was suggested 
that the rhetorical merger between science and romance may 
help both to reduce the general public’s anxiety about the 
social consequences of science and to mediate the 
traditional dispute between science and humanism. The 
purpose of this chapter is to analyze two additional 
romantic themes pivotal to much of Thomas’ essays— a 
predilection for diversity, ambiguity, and imperfection, 
and a vindication of the individual. The rhetorical 
function of these themes in the construction and 
justification of Thomas’ scientific-romantic synthesis, and 
how the rhetorical merger accommodates the aspirations and 
values of two audiences--scientists and the general public- 
wili be investigated.
Scientific Universalism Vs. Romantic Diversity 
The creators of modern science conceived the universe 
as a perfectly ordered machine; they claimed that 
underlying the infinite variety of nature was a series of 
immutable natural laws that govern the cosmos. These laws,
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uniformally applied to the cosmos, assumed determinacy in 
nature: all things were believed to fit perfectly together. 
From science’s perspective, apparent imperfections in 
nature were not viewed as imperfections at all; rather 
science construed these phenomena as temporarily beyond the 
grasp of human understanding. In short, the formation of 
every part of nature was assumed to contribute to a 
perfectly ordered, universal pattern in the universe. Thus, 
as Peckham argued, early modern science placed supreme 
emphasis on a value system that included "perfection, 
changelessness, [and] uniformity . .."144
Contemporary science has developed an understanding of 
the cosmos more comprehensive and sophisticated than the 
mechanical philosophy associated with its modern 
counterpart. Notwithstanding, as a number of scholars have 
noted, contemporary science is still characterized by an 
allegiance to values which assume an ordered universe, 
susceptible to explanation through rational inquiry. For 
example, in Theory and Research In The Communicative Arts. 
Ernest G. Bormann contends that one of the primary features 
of the scientific method is "that it searches for universal 
agreement about invariable relations such as those 
expressed in the laws of nature."145 In The Structure of 
Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, 
Ernest Nagel asserts that science is motivated by a desire 
for explanations "which are... systematic and controllable
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by factual evidence ..." Nagel adds that "the sciences seek 
to discover and formulate in general terms the conditions 
under which events of various sorts occur, the statements 
of such determining conditions being the explanations of 
the corresponding happenings."146 In Science as a Cultural 
Process. Maurice N. Richter, Jr. argues that "the goal of 
science ... involves the acquisition of systematic, 
generalized knowledge concerning the natural world; 
knowledge which helps man to understand nature, to predict 
natural events and to control natural forces."147 The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy claims that science practices 
"fidelity to empirical evidence and simplicity of logical 
formulation."148 Finally, most scholars of science seem to 
agree with Stephen W. Littlejohn's claim in Theories of 
Human Communication. that "... science is consistent with 
the philosophical position that the world has form and 
structure apart from the differences between individual 
observers.Ml4 9
The romantic movement, in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, rejected the mechanistic 
assumptions associated with early modern science and the 
values which continue to characterize contemporary science, 
for an organic model which provided a new, decidedly more 
complex system that would explain the nature of reality. 
Particularly those in literature and philosophy, for whom 
organicism replaced the mechanical philosophy, rejected the
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mechanistic science’s assumption that the universe is 
permanent, never changing, and designed like a perfect 
machine. Rather, for many poets and philosophers organicism 
posited a constantly changing and imperfect cosmos. Peckham 
provides a cogent explanation of romanticism’s 
philosophical commitment to organicism:
[For a romantic] ... the first quality of 
organicism is that ... the universe is alive...not 
something made, a perfect machine; it grows. 
Therefore change becomes positive value, not a 
negative one ... Anything that continues to grow, 
or change qualitatively, is not perfect, can, 
perhaps, never be perfect. Imperfection becomes a 
positive value ... with the intrusion of each 
novelty, the fundamental character of the 
universe ... changes. We have a universe of 
emergents.iso
In addition to explaining the quality of organicism as 
a characteristic part of the romantic epistemology, Peckham 
notes that some of the definitions of romanticism that have 
been widely used over the past fifty years include "... a 
love of the exotic ... a vindication of the individual ... 
[and] a reaction against the scientific method..."i31 
Eichner asserts that romanticism rejected early modern 
science’s conceptions of both a static universe and 
unchanging human nature. As a result, romanticism abandoned 
science’s preoccupation with, and admiration for, the 
"timeless [and] the universal." In fact, romanticism 
emphasises the "temporal, the local, and the 
individual."!52 Eichner suggests that unlike modern 
science, which assumed determinacy in nature and attempted
71
to establish timeless, universal laws, romanticism focuses 
on the "... unique, time-bound, and unrepeatable."153 The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains that romanticism revels 
in "disorder and uncertainty," and is "insistent on the 
uniqueness of the individual to the point of making a 
virtue of eccentricity."15* The Handbook To Literature 
contends that romanticism designates a literary and 
philosophical theory that places the individual at the 
center of all life and experience; for the Romantic, the 
individual is the focal point of art, "making literature 
most valuable as an expression of unique feelings and 
particular attitudes ..,"155 In The Great Chain of Being: A 
Study of the History of an Idea. Arthur Lovejoy claims that 
the Romantic believes "not only that in many, or in all, 
phases of human life there are diverse excellences, but 
that diversity itself is of the essence of excellence ..." 
the Romantic celebrates "the fullest possible expression of 
the abundance of differentness that there is, actually or 
potentially, in nature and in human nature ...”156 In 
summary, virtually all scholarship agrees that the romantic 
movement refused to be confined within the materialistic 
concepts of the orthodox scientific theory; in fact, 
romanticism promoted an aesthetic antipathy to 
standardization, a distrust of universal formulas, 
cultivation of individual peculiarities, and a sense of 
glory in the imperfect.
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Definitions of romanticism do not always differentiate 
these core romantic characteristics; though the essential 
spirit of these characteristics helps define two central 
romantic tenets celebrated in the popular scientific essays 
of Lewis Thomas. They may be explicitly stated as : (1) a
predilection for diversity, ambiguity, and imperfection, 
and (2) a vindication of the individual. Thomas merges 
these two themes with an emphasis on scientific rationality 
to produce a scientific-romantic orientation toward human 
disease, human ability for error, computers, and language.
Thomas on Universalism and Diversity
In "The Deacon's Masterpiece," Thomas explains that 
his "brightest" and most "optimistic" presentiment about 
the future of human health is that biomedical science will 
eventually have the knowledge base necessary to intervene 
and prevent the "finite list of major diseases that now 
close off life prematurely cr cause prolonged 
incapacitation and pain."137 In essence, Thomas claims that 
human disease mechanisms will eventually become 
"nonmysteries, accountable and controllable," and that 
humans will "someday be a disease-free species."158 Thomas 
remarks that some "intelligent listeners" might feel 
resentment and dismay at the prospect of science 
eradicating all human disease, and might view disease as a 
natural part of the human condition and scientific attempts 
to manipulate disease out of existence as violations
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against nature. Thomas records a series of questions (What 
on earth will we die of? Are we to go on forever, disease- 
free, with nothing to occupy our minds but the passage of 
time? What are the biologists doing to us?) that those
opposed to the scientific elimination of human disease 
might ask of science; he is particularly concerned,
however, with answering what he considers the most 
difficult question posed by those critical of scientific 
advancement against human disease: "How can you finish life 
honorably, and die honestly, without a disease?"159 In 
attempting to answer this question, Thomas equivocates 
between a romantic and scientific orientation toward
nature: initially, he suggests that science is incapable of 
responding to this inquiry and recommends poetry, a 
persuasive form typically associated with romanticism, as a 
source of direction. Specifically, Thomas examines Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s "The Deacon’s Masterpiece," a poem which 
might be read on two levels. On a literal level, Holmes’s 
verse seems to concern the disintegration of a well-made 
carriage:
Now in building of chaises, I tell you what 
There is always somewhere a weakest spot-- 
In hub, tire, felloe, in spring or thill,
In panel, or crossbar, or floor, or sill,
In screw, bolt, thoroughbrace--lurking still...
And that’s the reason, beyond a doubt,
That a chaise breaks down, but doesn’t wear 
out.16 0
A detailed anatomy of Holmes’s carriage might, however, on 
a more profound figurative level, be read as a metaphor
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"for a live organism— or...a cell."161 Thus, according to
Thomas, Holmes’s assumption that a carriage always has a
"weakest part, as though foreordained," implies a
nineteenth century view of disease and human death, which
provides a troublesome myth for the modern mind. This
perspective assumes that the living body is a "vulnerable,
essentially ramshackle affair, always at risk of giving way
at one point or another..."162 Thomas argues against this
so called nineteenth century myth regarding human disease;
essentially he does not view disease as an ingenerate
aspect of nature, and thus disagrees with the assumption
that the human body is destined for imperfection in the
form of disease. Moreover, he uses both the language of
science and the language of romanticism to advance the
claim that disease is a breach of nature, which denies the
human body a life of sustained physical and mental
perfection, and, ultimately, the opportunity to age
respectably and experience an orderly, natural death.
First, drawing upon the rhetoric of science, Thomas notes
recent advances in cellular biology that indicate that the
human body is a perfectly arranged system:
... with what is being learned about cellular 
biology, especially the form and function of 
subcellular structures and their macromolecular 
components, and the absolutely flawless
arrangement for drawing on solar energy for the
needs of all kinds of cells, the most impressive 
aspect of life is its sheer, tough power.163
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Hence, from a scientific perspective, Thomas is aghast to 
realize that a disorder of one part of the human body can 
"bring down the whole amazing system."164 In short, Thomas’ 
scientific orientation suggests that disease is an 
unnatural and, in fact, egregious violation of nature.
To support his scientific view of disease, Thomas
examines Holmes’s verse as a means for answering criticisms
of science’s ability to understand the ethical and moral
consequences involved in the eradication of human disease.
Thomas explains that exposure to a limited nineteenth
century scientific vision may have cultivated Holmes’s
skepticism about the possibility of a disease-free life; on
the other hand, Holmes was able to imagine the possibility
of sustained human perfection. In other words, through the
language of poetry and the power of creative imagination—
the language of romanticism— Holmes moved beyond the
restricted possibilities of nineteenth century science.
Specifically, Holmes imagined a carriage (understood as a
metaphor for a live organism) that lived an "unblemished
hundred years of undiseased life, each perfect part
supported by all the rest."165 Holmes’s carriage did
experience aging:
... but it was a respectable, decent, proper sort 
of aging ... and then [at] the hour of death...No 
tears, no complaints, no listening closely for 
last words. No grief. Just ... total 
fulfillment."166
This essay illustrates Thomas’ scientific-romantic 
orientation toward human disease as a phenomenon in nature. 
As a biologist, Thomas assumes that apparent imperfections 
in nature, in this instance human disease mechanisms, are 
not imperfections at all; rather, he explains these 
phenomena as temporarily beyond the grasp of scientific 
understanding. Hence, in maintaining a rhetorical 
allegiance to the scientific ethos, Thomas claims that all 
human disease will eventually become controllable. But 
Thomas’ attempt to answer criticisms of scientific efforts 
to eliminate human disease also appropriates certain 
aspects of romanticism. He admits that the language of 
science (ie., the scientific method) is neither strictly 
concerned with nor equipped to respond to this essay’s 
central question: "How can you finish life honorably, and
die honestly, without a disease?" This inquiry is imbued 
with romantic values, and as Thomas persuasively observes, 
more appropriately answered in poetry, which appeals to the 
human creative imagination as well as to the intellect. 
Thomas does not employ poetry, however, as the exemplary 
language for expressing a romantic orientation toward 
nature. Rather, he uses poetry as a persuasive tool to 
support a scientific perspective on human disease. More 
particularly, he invests rhetorical significance in the 
poet’s creative imagination as a means for advancing 
biomedical scientific research: Holmes’s imaginative
visualization suggests that human aging and death are more 
likely to be griefless, ordered, fulfilling experiences 
when disease is eliminated. In other words, Thomas has 
persuasively appropriated the language of romanticism to 
support a scientific value system emphasizing 
changelessness and perfection in nature. Furthermore, 
Thomas never explicitly rejects romanticism's general 
predilection for imperfection and diversity, but merges 
poetic form with a scientific perspective to demonstrate 
that the phenomena of human disease is not an imperfection 
in nature; that is, Thomas never mentions the possibility 
and potential value of other types of imperfections in 
nature. Finally, the subtext of Thomas’ remarks concerning 
human disease suggests that science shares romanticism’s 
interest in protecting humans’ individual dignity and 
integrity. Thomas’ rhetorical treatment of science’s 
solicitude for the individual is, however, ironical: he 
does not challenge romanticism’s assumption that the 
essence of human freedom is found in human diversity and 
uniqueness. Yet, he integrates poetry and science to 
demonstrate that human disease is an appalling mistake, and 
not a diverse and unique aspect of nature contributing to 
the preservation of individual dignity.
In "Autonomy" Thomas demonstrates a characteristically 
romantic concern for the diversity and imperfection 
inherent in humans’ unconsciously coordinated acts, and
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cautions experimental psychologists against using 
instrumental techniques of operant conditioning to control 
humans* visceral organs.
First, Thomas praises the individual’s capacity for
choice and change in tasks involving practical skills
(e.g., working a typewriter by touch, riding a bicycle);
these acts, though best coordinated through the unconscious
mind, are ultimately subject to rational judgment: an
individual possesses the option of whether or not to engage
in a particular activity. Accordingly, Thomas rejoices in
human diversity and imperfection:
If [humans] were born with all these knacks 
inbuilt, automated like ants, we would surely 
miss variety. It would be a less interesting world 
if we all walked and skipped alike, and never 
fell from bicycles. If we were all genetically 
programmed to play the piano deftly from birth we 
might never learn to understand music.167
These remarks suggest a synthesis of romantic and
scientific values. As a scientist, Thomas recognizes the
primary importance of rational thought in choosing to
engage in a task involving practiced skills. As a romantic,
he understands that genuine progress is predicated upon
human error and imperfection. In fact, Thomas intimates
that our ability to appreciate music’s intellectual and
emotional aspects is a result of the inevitable human error
involved in learning to master a musical instrument.
In this essay Thomas distinguishes external tasks 
(e.g., playing the piano) from internal biological
79
functions. The rational mind, in other words, can decide 
whether to engage in an external activity or not, but has 
no authority over the skilled manipulations performed by 
visceral organs. Thomas explains, however, that our 
interior domain, once regarded as inviolate, has recently 
come under more intense scientific scrutiny. Experimental 
psychologists have found, for instance, that viscera can be 
taught to perform various functions by the instrumental 
techniques of operant conditioning. Thus, with the proper 
technological application an individual might be taught to 
"change [his] rate of urine formation, raise or lower blood 
pressure, change ... heart rate, write different brain 
waves, at will."168 Thomas’ response to scientific attempts 
at self-control and self operation of humans’ interior 
domain is characterized by the ambiguous philosophical 
middle ground it achieves between science and romanticism. 
From a scientific viewpoint, Thomas adheres to a value 
system that accentuates natural perfection; he explains 
that our interior domain operates as a perfect biological 
system:
[Humans] smooth-muscle cells are born with 
complete instructions ... The arrangement is that 
of an ecosystem, with the operation of each part 
being governed by the state and function of the 
other parts. When things are going well, as they 
usually are, it is an infallible mechanism.189
Moreover, Thomas does exhibit an appreciation for the
scientific ethos which motivates attempts to control our
interior structures. For instance, he claims that
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controlling humans’ automatic functions is an "extremely 
important" prospect for which "one ought to feel elated." 
He admits that scientific attempts at self-operation 
present a "temptation," and he considers the prospect of 
changing certain aspects of his brain, with which he has 
"never really been satisfied," along with altering the 
operation of certain cells.170 On balance, however, Thomas 
is opposed to scientific attempts to improve the operation 
of our visceral organs. In a romantic vein, he suggests 
that regulating viscera would present the individual as 
well as science with "exhausting" and "debilitating" 
responsibilities. He claims that this technology would 
"consume" so much of one’s energy that one would "miss the 
main sources of the sensations of living."171 Ultimately, 
Thomas would "rather leave all... automatic functions with 
as much autonomy as they please, and hope for the best."172
These remarks contain three implications regarding 
Thomas’ scientific-romantic view of the humans’ internal 
domain. First, like a romantic, Thomas shows that our 
internal biology functions as an infallible mechanism, in 
spite of potential imperfections. In other words, he shares 
the characteristically romantic, and perhaps from a 
scientific viewpoint, paradoxical notion, that humans are 
perfect in their imperfection. As a scientist, though, 
Thomas is rhetorically sensitive to a scientific value 
system which emphasizes perfection. More precisely, he
recognizes that scientific intervention in nature is 
motivated by an axiology which venerates perfection. 
Second, as a romantic might, Thomas argues that scientific 
efforts to teach humans to communicate with their internal 
environment would burden the individual as well as science 
with "exhausting" and "debilitating" responsibilities. 
Science, according to this view, does not possess the moral 
and ethical language necessary to prepare the individual 
for the potential consequences accompanying the regulation 
of the interior domain. Moreover, Thomas intimates that the 
individual is presently ill equipped to withstand the added 
emotional and intellectual responsibility attending the 
control of internal biology. Third, Thomas’ contention that 
operant conditioning techniques might effectively estrange 
humans from their external environment echoes a romantic 
concern for individual freedom and personal development. In 
other words, scientific efforts at self-control might serve 
to restrict human autonomy and to deny an individual a 
deeper appreciation of his or her humanity. Thus Thomas 
indicates that authentic individual autonomy is achieved 
when one surrenders rational control of internal, automatic 
biological functions.
In "To Err is Human" Thomas reveals that the quality 
of infallibility, typically ascribed to computers,
contributes to the popular perception of computers as a 
dehumanizing technology. To combat this perception, and
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possibly to allay fears about humans’ increased dependence
on computers, he offers a rhetorical synthesis of romantic
and scientific viewpoints regarding human progress. This
synthesis is persuasively expressed in three interrelated
ways. First, as a romantic, Thomas celebrates the human
faculty for error as a uniquely human gift, necessary for
solving our most difficult problems. Unlike a romantic,
however, Thomas is unwilling to revel in the mystery of
human tendency toward error, and thus grounds an
explanation for human error in quasi-scientific language.
For example, he asserts that our ability for error may be
"stipulated in our genetic instructions," and that humans
may have "DNA sequences for making mistakes as a routine
part of living."173 He adds that the process of
exploration, occurring when there are more than two choices
available, is based on fallibility resulting from human
brain structure:
If [humans] had only a single center in [their]
brains, capable of responding only when a correct
decision was to be made, instead of the jumble of 
different, credulous, easily conned clusters of 
neurones that provide for being flung ... along 
wrong turnings ... [humans] could only stay the 
way [they] are today, stuck fast.174
Second, Thomas explains that computers, as products of 
human intellect, share an intrinsic human-like ability for 
error, and are therefore capable of realizing limitless 
possibilities for the future of humankind. Specifically, 
Thomas admits that computers are not capable of "real
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thinking and dreaming;" yet, he asserts that computers 
possess "something like" an unconscious, equivalent to that 
of humans, and are, in effect, extensions of the human 
brain, "constructed with the same property of error, 
spontaneous, uncontrolled, and rich in possibilities."175
Third, Thomas' veneration of the human ability for
error, and ascription of that ability to computers, is
strategically designed to promote the increased use of
computers and the power of rational thought as preeminent
tools for human progress. Thus Thomas remarks that error is
not as important to achieving human progress as "the move
based on error"; more particularly, he suggests that
cognitive ability for error, seemingly intrinsic to human
thought patterns, is indispensable for executing a higher,
more inspired level of rational thought. Accordingly, the
persuasive nexus between the human faculty for error and
higher levels of rational thought is critical to
understanding Thomas’ effort to mollify fears associated
with our increased dependency on complex computers:
. . . [a] computer can make calculations in an 
instant which would take a lifetime of slide 
rules for any of us ... Think what we could 
gain from the near infinity of precise, machine 
made miscomputation ... What we need, then, for 
moving ahead, is a set of wrong alternatives 
much longer and more interesting than the short 
list of mistaken courses that any of us can think 
up right now.176
Thomas is claiming that computers, as extensions of the
human brain, possess a vastly improved upon though
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nonetheless human-like faculty for problem solving and 
error. This perspective’s ascription of human-like 
qualities to computers challenges the popular perception of 
computers as a dehumanizing influence: specifically,
computers are no longer viewed as a cold, sterile, 
oppressive technological influence, serving to restrict 
human autonomy and accentuate human inadequacies, but are 
portrayed as a liberating force, imbued with a vital human­
like facility for error, and capable of providing solutions 
to difficult problems which will, ultimately, afford humans 
a splendid freedom. Thus Thomas’ direct celebration of 
human error, and more obscure though nonetheless determined 
concern for individual freedom, manifests a clear romantic 
orientation toward imperfection and individual status in an 
increasingly technological society. In the end, however, 
Thomas’ allegiance to these popular romantic themes seems 
calculated to gain wider acceptance of a scientific 
appreciation for computers: in short, according to a
scientific perspective, computers are designed to overcome 
human fallibility and methodological imprecision, and 
thereby make possible the type of perfection and material 
progress which science has traditionally, and most 
ardently, sought to achieve.
In "Computers" Thomas acknowledges computers’ 
significant though limited role in managing human affairs, 
and is rhetorically sensitive to the popular concern that
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computers' extraordinary capability for problem-solving 
will result in a computer-dominated world where human 
intellect ceases to be important. He also asserts that 
computers have a significantly different effect on human 
collective behavior than more common technologies such as 
radios, televisions, and telephones.
Echoing a scientific perspective, Thomas indicates 
that computers possess a remarkable faculty for problem­
solving which might complement human logical processes in
our quest for material and intellectual progress. For 
example, Thomas claims that in some respects computers have 
a "superhuman" ability to "... beat most [humans] at chess, 
memorize whole telephone books ... compose music ... write 
obscure poetry, diagnose heart ailments, [and] send 
personal invitations to vast parties . .."177 Thomas notes, 
however, that a computer is at best only a "single 
individual," in spite of its ability "to do everything we 
recognize as human." In addition, Thomas claims that
efforts to develop a computer to match humans’ collective 
behavior would be enormously expensive and involve a great 
deal of technical difficulty. In essence, to equal humans’ 
collective behavior, technologists would have to build and 
sustain three billion computers, "all ... wired together, 
intricately and deliberately, as [humans] are, 
communicating with each other, talking incessantly,
listening."178 Thomas describes human collective thinking
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as an "urgent biological function" characterized by the
need to exchange information; he claims that certain
technologies--telephones, radios, televisions, airplanes,
satellites— are forging a human "circuitry around the
earth," and that eventually, as a result, humans might
become a computer to end all computers, capable of fusing
all the thoughts of the world into a syncytium."179 Thomas
suggests that human collective thought is necessary to the
process of social evolution:
Effortlessly ... we are capable of changing 
language, music, manners, morals, entertainment, 
even the way we dress, all around the earth... 
we simply think our way along, pass information 
around, exchange codes disguised as art, change 
our minds, transform ourselves ... computers 
cannot deal with such levels of 
improbability ...1 8 0
Thomas’ remarks regarding computers, more common 
technologies, human collective behavior, and social 
evolution reflect a rhetorical tension between science and 
romance in three ways. First, from a scientific 
perspective, Thomas recognizes that computers possess a 
facility for problem-solving which, though unable to 
prescribe human behavior, contributes greatly to human 
material progress. More important, he seems to be 
suggesting that, unlike computers, more common technologies 
(e.g., televisions, radios, telephones) connect human minds 
without destroying the unpredictability and improbability 
of human thought. He intimates that technology is a 
principle agent for the unification and organization of
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collective human behavior, yet ultimately serves a passive 
role subject to human control. As such, according to 
Thomas, technology will continue to provide the opportunity 
for human collective behavior, but will never regulate the 
essential content and humanness of the collective thought 
necessary for social evolution. Thus Thomas is rhetorically 
sensitive to the popular fear that computers will diminish 
the importance of, and perhaps dominate, human intellect, 
and he is able, at the same time, to preserve technology's 
privileged status in society.
Second, in a romantic vein, Thomas indicates that the 
future is too "interesting and dangerous" to be entrusted 
to computers, which are predictable, reliable agencies, not 
equipped with the levels of improbability required to "keep 
open all [human] options." In other words, he claims that 
the process of social evolution would "grind to a 
standstill" if humankind appointed computers to develop 
long range societal plans.181 Like a romantic, Thomas 
venerates diversity and imperfection: he understands that
human fallibility and unpredictability sustain the 
collective thought necessary for social evolution.
Finally, Thomas’ perspective on technology and human 
collective behavior manifests a scientific-romantic 
orientation toward individualism: in a romantic fashion,
Thomas is keenly concerned about the loss of individual 
freedom in an increasingly technological society, and is
particularly vigilant to defend the integrity of human 
intellect against computers* sovereign influence. Thomas’ 
view regarding how best to achieve individuality, however, 
is characterized by the ambiguous philosophical middle 
ground it achieves between science and romanticism. 
Specifically, Thomas indicates that a person is best able 
to realize his or her individuality and human potential in 
interaction with other persons, and that human interaction 
is made possible largely through the use of technology. In 
essence, Thomas* orientation toward individualism, neither 
purely romantic nor purely scientific, relies for its 
rhetorical power on an equivocation between the two
perspectives.
Thomas* Perspective: Science Vs. Humanism 
"Humanities and Science" and "On Matters of Doubt" 
represent Thomas’ most explicit discussions of the
historical tension between science and humanism. In
"Humanities and Science" Thomas argues that traditional 
scientific pedagogy has made two basic errors contributing 
to disagreements between humanists and scientists; division 
between the two groups centers on the "importance of 
science in a liberal-arts education, and the role of 
science in twentieth-century culture."182 First, according 
to Thomas, the sciences have been taught as a vast array of 
immutable, hard facts to be learned as fundamentals; and 
second, scientific facts have been taught as "somehow
89
superior to the facts in all other scholarly disciplines 
..."is3 Moreover, Thomas claims that these errors in the 
teaching of science, along with science's efficacy for 
gaining information and comprehension about nature, have 
created two popular misconceptions among the general 
public— that science is simply a matter of translating 
observations about nature into quantitative measurements, 
and that science has a virtually complete understanding of 
the material universe. Thomas uses the language of
romanticism to challenge traditional scientific pedagogy as 
well as popular misconceptions about the accuracy and
extent of scientific knowledge. Despite conventional 
wisdom, Thomas argues that the sciences and humanities do 
not represent fundamentally different kinds of learning, 
and might actually complement each other’s efforts to 
acquire a more complete understanding of nature.
Thomas' recommendation for changes in the way science 
is taught places a characteristically romantic emphasis on 
what he views as the the inherent tentativeness,
incompleteness, and strangeness in scientific learning. For 
example, Thomas asserts that introductory courses in
science, at all levels, should leave so-called fundamental 
scientific facts aside and "... concentrate the attention 
of all students on the things that are not known."184 He 
claims that preliminary scientific training should stress 
the "still imponderable puzzles of cosmology," and declares
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that there are "... some things going on in the universe 
that lie beyond comprehension . ,."185 Like a romantic, 
Thomas explains that the "very strangeness of nature" 
should be at the core of scientific education. Moreover, he 
departs from the traditional view that science involves an 
orderly, systematic inspection of nature which results in 
firm scientific conclusions about the natural world. 
Rather, as a romantic might, Thomas emphasizes the 
incompleteness and tentative nature of scientific 
knowledge; he wants to dispel the popular perception that 
the sciences are an academic collection of unambiguous, 
unalterable facts which need only to be learned to achieve 
a complete understanding of nature. Indeed, Thomas claims 
that scientific facts are not "... more fundamental, more 
solid, less subject to subjectivism, [and] immutable" than 
the facts that underlie other scholarly disciplines.186 
Thomas does acknowledge that science has sophisticated 
instruments for quantitative measurement which can provide 
a deep understanding of nature, but admonishes that science 
must first know when and how to use quantitative 
measurement (i.e, science must understand when and how to 
convert observations into numbers), and second realize that 
even the most precise scientific measurements are unlikely 
to explain all there is to know about nature.
Unlike many other public scientists (e.g., Carl Sagan), 
Thomas does not emphasize the extraordinary capacity or
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even the impressive record science has for explaining
natural phenomena; rather, in a romantic vein, he
celebrates science’s ability to provide revelations of
human ignorance about nature. Essentially, Thomas 
attributes romantic characteristics to science that are 
more typically ascribed to humanistic study. He reverses 
the traditional view regarding the conclusive nature of
scientific data and the tentative quality of humanistic 
knowledge. For example, Thomas claims that science has more 
than "seven-time-seven types of ambiguity," and that the 
"poetry of Wallace Stevens is crystal clear along side the 
genetic code."187 In other words, Thomas is suggesting that 
scientific facts can potentially be more complex and 
difficult to understand than the most opaque poetry.
Moreover, he notes that what appear to be solid
scientific judgments are always more conditional and
subject to revision than are most conclusions of humanistic
scholarship:
The hard facts [of science] tend to soften 
overnight, melt away, and vanish under the 
pressure of new hard facts ... The conclusions 
reached in science are always ... far more 
provisional and tentative than are most 
assumptions arrived at ... in the humanities.188
Thomas explains the nature of scientific learning and the
potential influence science education has on individual
intellectual development in much the same fashion that a
romantic might characterize the essence of humanistic
learning and the possible effect humanities education has
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on the quality of individual thought. For instance, he does 
not advance the traditional view of science as a rigorous, 
potentially tedious and routinized activity primarily 
concerned with establishing and systematizing facts, 
principles, and methods; nor does he express science’s 
conventional praise for the significant technological 
applications and material progress that might result from 
scientific research. Rather, he describes science as "an 
endless frontier," "high adventure," and the "wildest of 
all explorations ever undertaken by human beings;" 
furthermore, he suggests that the study of science is "a 
good in itself," and ought to provide an individual the 
"cast of thought" needed both to appreciate inexplicable 
aspects of nature and to live into the twenty-first 
century.189 Thomas’ description of science as a type of 
romantic pursuit and a scholarly discipline capable of 
providing instruction in the art of living is, of course, a 
characterization more commonly used to depict humanistic 
study. In short, science has historically represented a 
mode of thought antithetical to the spirit of romanticism; 
humanistic study, on the other hand, has traditionally 
provided an aesthetic experience compatible with popular 
romantic values.
In summary, Thomas uses the language of science and 
romanticism to construct a persuasive merger of scientific 
and romantic values: his portrayal of science includes a
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characteristically romantic preoccupation with ambiguity in 
nature along with an abiding romantic concern for 
individual development. The strategic attribution of these 
romantic characteristics to science enhances the scientific 
ethos. Science is not pictured as an intimidating, 
inaccessible, esoteric discipline studied by the privileged 
elite, but rather as a humane area of learning open for 
participation to the nonscientist. Finally, Thomas' 
romantic-science admits to being an incomplete field of 
inquiry, baffled by certain ambiguities in nature, and thus 
actively solicits the aid of traditional humanistic 
viewpoints to gain a more complete understanding of the 
natural world.
In "On Matters of Doubt," Thomas returns to a 
discussion of the historical tension between science and 
humanism, claiming that the viewpoints expressed by C. P. 
Snow, on the side of scientists, and F. R. Leavis, on the 
side of humanists, embody the quintessential and still 
unsettled argument between science and humanism. Thomas 
provides a summary of the positions taken by Snow and 
Leavis with a view toward achieving a rhetorical 
accommodation between their competing perspectives.
At the one polemical extreme, Leavis claims that 
scientists are a "bright but illiterate lot, well read in 
nothing except science ... [and] incapable of writing good 
novels."190 On the other side of the argument, Snow insists
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that humanists have an "antiscientific prejudice," and that 
the humanities are made up of "imagined unverifiable 
stories cooked up by poets and novelists." Snow claims, 
moreover, that the sciences deal with "hard data, 
incontrovertible theories ... the unambiguous facts of 
life."191 Thomas’ persuasive mediation between these two 
perspectives is predicated on a scientific-romantic 
orientation toward nature. As a scientist, he suggests that 
every aspect of nature fits together harmoniously to form a 
perfect whole, and that any question to be asked about 
nature or about humans will eventually be answered; as a 
romantic, Thomas places great importance on ambiguous 
facets of human existence and on the general ignorance both 
the sciences and the humanities have of nature. He uses 
this merger of scientific and romantic perspectives to 
accentuate the "human meaning of contemporary science" and 
to thereby mediate the rival claims of science and 
humanism. For example, Thomas* romantic-science includes 
the claim that all scholars share a single underlying view 
of nature best characterized as "bewilderment." This view 
suggests that the more the sciences and the humanities 
learn about nature and about human beings the less each 
group comprehends. Though Thomas adds that scientists and 
humanists alike, when confronted with ambiguity in nature, 
typically choose to deny their bewilderment and to take 
refuge in whatever "fixed knowledge" is available:
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... bewilderment is kept hidden in the darkest 
closets of all our institutions of higher 
learning, repressed whenever it seems to be 
emerging into public view, sometimes glimpsed 
staring from the attic windows like a mad 
cousin of learning. [Bewilderment] is the family 
secret of twentieth-century science, and of 
twentieth-century arts and letters as well.192
Like a romantic, Thomas takes a deep satisfaction in the
recognition that humans still have a great deal to learn
about nature, that they are, or should be in fact,
bewildered by nature. He admonishes scientists and
humanists to refrain from presenting the body of human
knowledge as a vast structure of coherent information
capable of explaining every aspect of nature; instead, he
encourages both groups to admit that the corpus of human
learning, enormous though it may be, is still a "very
modest mound of puzzlements that do not fit together at
all.193 Finally, Thomas’ veneration of natural ambiguity is
strategically designed to recognize scientists’ and
humanists’ potentially deep ignorance of nature, and to
raise the idea of bewilderment to an intellectual value.
Thomas’ romantic emphasis on ambiguity is also 
reflected in his essays on language. In fact, several of 
his essays merge scientific and romantic perspectives to 
explain the nature of language. In "Information," for 
example, this rhetorical synthesis is clearly evident. From 
a scientific perspective, Thomas assumes that language is a 
genetically determined mechanism; he suggests that "human 
beings are all born with a genetic endowment for
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recognizing and formulating language.194 Accordingly,
Thomas is sympathetic to the view that language is a
biologic system for communication, and that the framework
for meaning in language is built into the human mind at
birth. Ultimately, however, Thomas finds this view too 
mechanistic and restricting to explain fully the rich and
complex nature of language. Thus, not completely satisfied 
with a scientific approach to understanding language, 
Thomas draws upon romanticism for a more comprehensive 
explanation. More specifically, he places a
characteristically romantic emphasis on language’s
capacity for ambiguity. In essence, his celebration of 
ambiguity in language has two rhetorical implications. 
First, he suggests that the property of ambiguity 
distinguishes language (i.e. as a biologic system) from 
biologic systems for communication used by speechless 
animals: the genetically determined communication
mechanisms of speechless animals are limited to "single- 
stage transactions;" these mechanisms are designed to 
"stick precisely" to the matter at hand, and are simply not 
programmed to "drift away in the presence of locked-on 
information."195 Thomas describes a bee in search of 
sugar, among other examples, to illustrate the limited 
(i.e. ambiguity-free) manner in which these mechanisms 
search for biologic information. He explains that..."when a 
bee is tracking sugar by polarized light, observing the sun
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as though consulting his watch, he does not veer away to 
discover an unimaginable marvel of a flower."196
Second, Thomas suggests that ambiguity is an essential
element for transferring information among humans. He
claims that "if it were not for the capacity for ambiguity,
for the sensing of strangeness, that words in all languages
provide, [humans] would have no way of recognizing the
layers of counterpoint in meaning..."197 Thomas adds that
"it is often necessary, for meaning to come through, that
[language have] an almost vague sense of strangeness and
askewness.1,19 8 Thus, unlike a scientist who might claim
that precision in language is necessary for the acquisition
of knowledge, Thomas indicates that the most important
human knowledge may result from the uncertain meanings in
language. Like a romantic, Thomas revels in the mysterious
complexity of language; he views language as something more
than a purely static, preset biological property of the
human mind. In fact, in a number of essays Thomas compares
language to a living organism. For example, in "Small Talk"
he claims that "language, once it comes alive, behaves like
an active, motile organism ... the underlying structure
simply grows, enriches itself, expands."199 In "Living
Language," Thomas returns to a comparison of language to a
living organism:
... language is simply alive, like an organism.
We tell each other this, in fact, when we speak 
of living languages, and I think we mean 
something more than an abstract metaphor. We mean
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alive. Words are the cells of language, moving
the great body, on legs.800
Thomas' suggestion that the element of ambiguity is
responsible for, or at least closely linked to, the
evolution of language contains an important epistemological 
implication concerning his view of the human mind. Thomas 
seems to be saying that the human mind is actually designed 
to handle ambiguity in language. Thus, Thomas does not view 
the human mind as a passive entity, programmed to focus 
exclusively on one piece of information at a time. Rather, 
in a romantic fashion, he acknowledges that learning new 
information, through the use of language, involves an 
initial creative capacity of the mind itself. As Thomas 
states, the human mind is able to "drift away in the 
presence of locked-on information, straying from each point 
in a hunt for a better, different point."201 The
implication of this view is that the mind is an active
system, which while not able to control the ambiguities of 
language, is at least able to respond to them.
In summary, Thomas' romantic emphasis on language’s 
capacity for ambiguity suggests that scientific 
investigation may be unable to fully explain the nature and 
origin of language. To be clear, Thomas is not opposed to 
the method or findings of linguists who have determined, 
after examining language as a biologist might scrutinize 
live tissue, that the universal attributes are genetically 
set; in fact, as a scientist, Thomas seems comfortable with
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the language of genetics. Nevertheless, Thomas persuasively 
underscores the importance of ambiguity in language. He
argues that the ambiguous and uncertain meanings in 
language may actually account for the diverse range of
human behavior. Finally, Thomas' suggestion that language 
is a uniquely human trait, partly beyond the grasp of 
scientific investigation, exemplifies a romantic 
orientation toward humankind. He has, in short, 
persuasively identified language as a human characteristic 
inaccessible to scientific definition, thus contributing to 
the type of human freedom a romantic readily embraces.
Thomas, Science, and the Public Good
The merger of romantic and scientific values reflected
in Thomas’ orientation toward ambiguous and imperfect 
aspects of human existence, as well as toward individual 
freedom, is a constituent in the larger scientific-romantic 
synthesis found in Thomas’ public science. As such, the 
rhetorical impact of this merger deserves evaluation in 
respect to four research questions set forth in this 
dissertation: Might the rhetorical merger of romantic and 
scientific values reflected in the language Thomas uses to 
discuss human disease, human ability for error, computers, 
and language help to (1) mediate the traditional dichotomy 
between science and humanism? (2) envision a cooperative 
relationship between the scientific community and the 
general public? (3) provide the general public a greater
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role in establishing criteria for judgment for private and 
public decision-making? and (4) highlight the general 
public's capacity to respond to aspects of the world 
inaccessible to the interpretive framework of science and 
ordinary rational thought?
The equivocation between scientific and romantic
values found in Thomas’ .orientation toward human disease, 
human ability for error, computers, and language provides a 
rhetorical middle ground capable of mitigating the long 
standing dispute between science and humanism. Scientists, 
eager to eliminate disease and to promote a value system 
emphasizing changelessness and perfection in nature, should 
welcome Thomas’ suggestion that apparent imperfections in 
nature, and particularly human disease, are not 
imperfections at all, but rather phenomena temporarily 
beyond the grasp of scientific understanding. In essence, 
scientists should find satisfaction in Thomas’ claims that 
the human body is not destined for imperfection in the form 
of disease, and that all human disease will eventually 
become controllable. Humanists, on the other hand, while 
perhaps not content with Thomas’ support for the 
eradication of all human disease, should find a certain 
satisfaction in Thomas’ use of poetry to answer potential 
ethical and moral criticism of scientific attempts to 
control nature. For example, humanists might claim that 
Thomas’ use of Holmes's verse as a persuasive tool to
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support a scientific perspective on human disease does not 
enhance the scientific ethos but, in fact, reveals one of 
science’s fundamental shortcomings: namely, that the
language of science is ill equipped to respond to ethical 
and moral meanings in the world. Thus humanists would be 
pleased with Thomas’ aesthetic appreciation for, and
rhetorical dependence on, poetry as a persuasive means for 
promoting the scientific enterprise, and would claim that 
Thomas’ use of a poem to support a scientific perspective 
on nature actually validates the usefulness of a humanistic 
approach to understanding nature.
The subtext of Thomas’ remarks regarding human disease 
suggests that scientists and humanists have a shared 
concern for maintaining humans’ individual dignity. The two 
groups appear, however, to have widely differing 
perspectives concerning the effect disease has on the 
quality of human life. Thomas, on the side of science, 
suggests that the elimination of disease will allow the 
individual to live a life of sustained mental and physical 
perfection, age respectably, and experience an orderly, 
natural death; essentially, he suggests that a disease-free 
life would reduced the burden of human suffering, thereby 
contributing to individual freedom and the quality of human 
life. Humanists, on the other hand, though likely to 
recognize sincerity in his concern for human welfare, are 
likely to disagree with Thomas* rhetorical perspective on
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human disease. From a humanistic viewpoint, disease is a 
necessary part of the human condition, serving to remind 
the individual of his or her mortality. The physical and 
mental suffering accompanying disease helps to define the 
human condition, and the elimination of disease would, in 
effect, alter the individual's understanding of what it 
means to be a person.
Thomas' claims that humans' internal biology functions 
as an infallible mechanism, in spite of potential 
imperfections, and that experimental psychologists should 
refrain from using operant conditioning techniques to 
control humans’ visceral organs, are also consistent with 
the humanistic orientation. In addition, humanists should 
find satisfaction in Thomas’ admission that science does 
not possess the ethical and moral language necessary to 
prepare an individual for the potential consequences 
accompanying the ability to regulate his or her interior 
domain. Scientists, on the other hand, may appreciate the 
subtle irony of Thomas' romantic emphasis on imperfection. 
For example, his opposition to scientific attempts to 
improve the operation of humans’ visceral organs is based 
on the paradoxical belief that humans are perfect in their 
imperfection. Thus, Thomas' celebration of imperfection is 
designed to legitimate a scientific vision of nature 
emphasizing perfection.
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Thomas' is also sensitive to humanists* fear that 
computers are diminishing the importance of human 
intellect; in fact, Thomas’ ascription of human-like 
qualities to computers may allay the apprehension that 
computers are a dehumanizing influence, incapable of error. 
He illustrates that, rather than restrict and devalue the 
importance of human intellect, computers will provide 
solutions to difficult problems, affording humans greater 
individual freedom. Finally, humanists are likely to 
applaud Thomas' belief that cognitive ability for error, 
intrinsic to human thought patterns, is indispensable for 
executing an advanced level of rational thought. 
Scientists, on the other side of the argument, may be 
willing to overlook Thomas' romantic emphasis on humans’ 
cognitive ability for error, particularly since Thomas’ 
underlying motivation is to promote the increased use of 
computers and the power of rational thought as preeminent 
tools for human progress.
Thomas’ discussions of the historical tension between 
science and humanism suggest that the sciences and the 
humanities do not represent fundamentally different kinds 
of learning. In general, humanists may be more willing than 
scientists to accept Thomas’ claim that all scholars share 
a single underlying view of the world best characterized as 
bewilderment; specifically, many traditional scientists are 
not likely to agree with Thomas’ claim that scientific
knowledge is always more conditional and subject to 
revision than are most conclusions of humanistic 
scholarship. They are likely to interpret Thomas’ failure 
to underscore the conclusive nature of scientific data, as 
well as to emphasize the impressive record science has for 
explaining natural phenomena, as a challenge to the 
objectivity of scientific thought. In fact, scientists 
might argue that Thomas is rhetorically naive for not 
stressing the success of science in formulating and 
testing theories that explain phenomena in the natural 
world. Nevertheless, Thomas’ strategic depiction of science 
as a humane area of learning, capable of providing 
revelations of human ignorance about nature enhances the 
overall ethos of scientists. Finally, Thomas’ rhetorical 
perspective on ambiguous facets of human existence, and on 
the potentially deep ignorance both the sciences and 
humanities have of nature, encourages scientists and 
humanists to be more cooperative with one another and to be 
more careful in their knowledge claims.
The merger of romantic and scientific values reflected 
in Thomas’ orientation toward ambiguous and imperfect 
aspects of human existence, as well as toward individual 
freedom, envisions a cooperative relationship between the 
scientific community and the general public. In the 
twentieth century, science has gained enormous respect 
among the general public as a means for explaining natural
phenomena and for increasing humans’ overall standard of 
living. In the past fifty years however— particularly since 
the dawning of the nuclear age— the public’s enthusiasm for 
science has been tempered: they have begun to realize that 
science is incapable of providing solutions to all human 
ailments and is even responsible for creating additional 
ones.202 Thomas’ dymystification of science is important, 
then, because it relocates the role of the public in 
relation to science. Thus, members of the general public 
who have read Thomas’ essays should appreciate his claim 
that experimental psychologists ought to refrain from
attempts to control humans’ visceral organs; they are
likely to agree with Thomas’ assertion that operant
conditioning techniques might effectively estrange humans 
from their external environment and, rather than lead to 
greater human autonomy, deny an individual a deeper 
appreciation of his or her humanity. Moreover, Thomas is 
sensitive to public fears of science in his suggestion that 
the individual is not prepared for the emotional and
intellectual responsibility that would accompany the
ability to control his or her internal biology: serious 
attempts to control internal biology may cause the
individual to miss the "main sources of the sensations of 
living."203 In essence, Thomas’ work is designed to
demonstrate to the general public his opposition to
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scientific attempts to control our internal domain as a 
persuasive defense of individual freedom.
The psychological, emotional, and financial burden 
that disease places upon the afflicted individual is 
experienced, to a lesser degree, by his or her family and 
the larger community. In fact, the high cost in human lives 
exacted by diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and more 
recently to AIDS, is of continuing concern to society. On 
the other hand, the general public is probably cognizant of 
the emotional and financial cost likely to accompany the 
elimination of disease, for the individual as well as 
society. For instance, the financial cost associated with a 
significantly increased life expectancy is potentially 
enormous; additionally, twenty or thirty added years of 
daily living may present an individual with novel and 
unanticipated problems. On balance, however, the general 
public is likely to find Thomas’ explanation for scientific 
attempts to eradicate disease quite persuasive. For Thomas 
uses the idiom of the ordinary citizen, rather than 
science, to discuss the manner in which scientific issues, 
like the study of disease, impact upon the individual human 
being. In short, the public may agree with Thomas’ 
rhetorical perspective on disease, particularly, with his 
claim that the elimination of disease will reduce 
unnecessary incapacitation and prolonged human suffering
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and thus enhance individual freedom and the quality of 
human life.
Thomas’ persuasive depiction of science as a humane 
area of learning, capable of providing instruction in the 
art of living, has educational value in so far as it 
encourages the general public to be less wary of the 
scientific enterprise as an arcane discipline studied by a 
select group, and to view science as a method of learning 
open for participation to the nonscientist.
Furthermore, Thomas’ rhetorical preoccupation with 
imperfect and ambiguous facets of human existence provides 
the general public a greater role in establishing judgment 
in private and public decision-making. For example, Thomas’ 
claim that faculty for error is a uniquely human trait, 
necessary for solving our most difficult problems, 
encourages the individual layperson to be more self-reliant 
in his or her judgments about the world. The individual can 
recognize that human error invests human experience with 
emotional and intellectual meaning. Additionally, Thomas’ 
persuasive recognition of the potentially deep ignorance of 
nature common to both the sciences and the humanities 
inspires confidence in the individual layperson to develop 
his or her own criteria for judgment in private and public 
decision-making, independent of counsel from scientists or 
humanists.
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Finally, Thomas* persuasive identification of language 
as a human characteristic inaccessible to scientific 
definition fosters an impression that certain aspects of 
the world are inaccessible to the interpretive framework of 
science and ordinary rational thought. As a result, the 
individual layperson may be more willing to turn to other 
authorities or aids for judgment in both private and public 
decision-making.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified two popular romantic 
themes in Lewis Thomas* public science: a predilection for
diversity, ambiguity, and imperfection, and a vindication 
of the individual. The chapter evaluated the way these two 
themes are developed in essays selected to illuminate these 
themes and the way they are merged with scientific 
rationality to produce a vision of popular science capable 
of mitigating the traditional division between science and 
humanism. The chapter also examined the persuasive impact 
this scientific-romantic synthesis might have in 
establishing a more cooperative relationship between the 
scientific community and the general public. Chapter four 
will proceed to identify and evaluate two final popular 
romantic themes evident in the larger scientific-romantic 
synthesis that serves as the underlying value system for 
Thomas* popular scientific essays.
Chapter Four
It was argued in chapter three that Thomas merged two 
popular romantic themes--a predilection for diversity, 
ambiguity, and imperfection, and a vindication of the 
individual— with scientific rationality to produce a 
scientific-romantic synthesis. The ways in which this 
persuasive merger of science and romance helped both to 
mitigate the general public’s apprehension about the social 
consequences of science and to mediate the long standing 
controversy between science and humanism were examined. The 
purpose of this chapter is to analyze two additional 
romantic themes that undergird much of Thomas’ discourse. 
The two themes— wonder at and awe of nature, and a concern 
for humans’ moral characteristics--serve as integral 
components in the romantic axiology in his essays. The 
rhetorical function of these themes in the construction and 
justification of Thomas’ scientific-romantic synthesis will 
be explored. Finally, ways in which the persuasive merger 
accommodates the aspirations and values of two audiences—  
scientists and the general public— shall be addressed
Dominance, Wonder and Awe in Science and Romanticism 
The creators of modern science developed a mechanical 
philosophy that placed supreme emphasis on rational thought 
and observation as human tools instrumental in explaining
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the nature of the physical universe; they assumed that 
natural phenomena are causally determined in conformity 
with a series of immutable natural laws that govern the 
cosmos.204 In essence, the mechanical philosophy guiding 
modern science designated human rationality as the most 
efficient means to acquire scientific knowledge of the 
natural world; the accumulation of scientific knowledge was 
primarily designed to afford greater understanding of, and 
control over, the processes of nature.
Contemporary science has acquired a more sophisticated 
view of the physical universe than the mechanical 
philosophy associated with its modern counterpart. As a 
number of scholars have noted however, contemporary science 
is still characterized by a need to understand and control 
nature through rational inquiry. For example, in The 
Scientific World View. William Kay Wallace suggests that 
the long-range activity of science as a collective 
enterprise has played a significant role in the conquest of 
nature and the development of our present system of 
industrial organization.205 In Conceptual Foundations of 
Scientific Thought: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Science. Marx W. Wartofsky contends that "the activity 
which science represents ... involves ... the power of 
[scientific] knowledge as an instrument of human use, for 
control over nature."206 In The Domination of Nature, 
William Leiss asserts that "modern science represents the
Ill
highest possible development of [humans’] drive for power,
for it strives to covert the entirety of nature into a
field of operation for exclusively human purposes . .."202
Traditionally, in attempting to control nature, 
science has focused exclusively on observably measurable 
phenomena to the exclusion of humans’ spiritual needs. In 
fact, a number of scholars have commented upon science’s 
devaluation of knowledge acquired through human 
introspection and human sensations. For example, Leiss 
noted that "one means of understanding the mode of 
abstraction which guides modern science is to realize that 
it devalues the cognitive significance of all those things 
(e.g., sense qualities, final causes, aesthetic values) 
which do not aid in [humans] domination of things . . ."20s
Leiss also noted that in terms of scientific knowledge "a 
proposition makes no sense whose affirmation or denial 
would not result in a difference that could ultimately be 
expressed in some measurable form."209 In Art and Human 
Values. Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup claim that "in 
science ... man is observer--ideally, an instrument— intent 
on knowing what things are apart from human desires, 
wishes, hopes, fears."210 In Movements of Thought in the
Nineteenth Century, George Herbert Mead stated that 
mechanical science "did not deal with the values which 
objects directly have in [human] experience-~those of 
sensation ... color, sound, taste, and order ... and
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perhaps more important, [science] did not deal with the 
characters which belong to living organisms."211 
Essentially Mead maintained that science "reduces the world 
simply to a congeries of physical particles, atoms, and 
electrons ... [and thereby] takes all the meaning out of 
it."212 In The Pentagon of Power, Lewis Mumford claimed 
that the ultimate effect of mechanistic science was "to 
devaluate every aspect of human experience that could not 
be" directly observed; and the "[scientific method’s] final 
result was to eliminate all other products and by-products 
of the human personality ,.."213 In summary, the mechanical 
philosophy associated with early modern science sought to 
comprehend and to transform nature for human purposes. 
Indeed, the underlying philosophical impulse to understand 
and to master nature has remained constant within the 
scientific community for over three centuries— even until 
the present day. As Mumford observed, "the world picture of 
the [contemporary] scientist ... still remains without 
"blue, yellow, bitter, sweet, beauty, delight, sorrow— in 
short, without the most vivid reports of human 
experience."214
The romantic movement, in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, rejected the philosophical 
foundations of early modern science as well as the values 
which still characterise contemporary science. One 
important aspect of the philosophical conflict between
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modern science and romanticism, still evident in criticisms 
of contemporary science, centered upon their opposing 
responses to nature. Rather than seek to dissect and 
control nature, in the manner of both modern and 
contemporary science, romanticism demonstrated a love of 
nature and especially a sense of awe and wonder in the 
presence of nature. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy noted 
that one of the great romantic themes was "the continuity 
of life and flow, growth, development; a process, to the 
romantic, always denatured, indeed destroyed, by the 
dividing analytical mind ...”21s The romantic epistemology 
posited a cosmos significantly more complex than the static 
universe depicted by mechanical philosophy. Essentially, 
romanticism rebelled against science's fidelity to 
empirical data as the only valid means for acquiring 
knowledge about the physical universe and, in fact, what it 
means to be a living being. Typically romanticists claimed 
to be concerned with the moral knowledge that might be 
derived from human experience, and they often viewed nature 
as a source of profound spiritual truths about the essence 
of human existence. Indeed, nature has supplied a 
significant part of the imaginative subject matter for 
romantic literature, especially poetry. A Handbook To 
Literature claims that "the greatest attention to nature in 
English literature came in the Romantic Period, when the 
revolt against conventionalities of neoclassic fashions
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lead to much theorizing about the relations of human beings 
to external nature . .,"216 For example, a romantic poet 
such as Wordsworth "turned to nature ... in the hope of 
finding a realm comparable with his spiritual needs."217 In 
essence, romanticism emphasised individual introspection, 
intuition, and an emphatic approach to nature to generate a 
metaphysical knowledge of the senses. This metaphysical 
knowledge, derived from human interaction with, and 
imaginative speculation about nature, wps thought by many 
poets and philosophers to minister to the human spirit in a 
way that purely scientific knowledge could not.
Definitions of romanticism do not always differentiate 
these core romantic characteristics; though the essential 
spirit of these characteristics helps to define two central 
romantic tenets in the popular scientific essays of Lewis 
Thomas. They may be explicitly stated as: (1) wonder at and
awe of nature, and (2) a concern for humankinds* spiritual 
needs. Thomas merges these two themes with an emphasis on 
scientific rationality to produce a scientific-romantic 
orientation toward certain life processes in nature, 
literature, a human cell, beavers and otters, and human 
altruism and honesty.
Thomas on the Dominance of Nature
In "Natural Man," Thomas first explains that a 
revolution in human thought has redefined humankinds’ 
relationship to nature: humans, experiencing a new
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awareness about the degree to which they are involved in 
the earth’s life, have begun to react against the old human 
impulse, embodied in the scientific method, to master 
nature. Second, Thomas offers a persuasive proposal, 
merging scientific and romantic values, for resolving the 
cognitive dissonance we experience when recognizing, on the 
one hand, that we are an integral part of nature and should 
strive to protect and maintain the natural environment, and 
realizing, on the other hand, that humankind is apparently 
bound to continue subjugating nature.
Thomas claims that we have begun to reject the view 
that we are separate and qualitatively different from 
nature, and that the earth is our "... personal property 
... placed at [our] disposal to be consumed, ornamented, or 
pulled apart as [we] wished."218 According to Thomas, the 
present consensus "almost everywhere" is that humankind is 
intimately connected to and dependent for survival upon 
nature--is actually linked in symbiosis with nature--and 
therefore humans should aim to preserve rather than control 
nature.219 Thomas asserts that our contemporary perspective 
on nature suggests that we are "neither owners nor 
operators" of nature, but may be "motile tissue specialized 
for receiving information--perhaps ... functioning as a 
nervous system for the whole [earth]."220 Thomas adds that 
humans’ new view of nature "has been strong enough to 
launch ... movements for the sustenance of wilderness, the
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protection of wildlife, the turning off of insatiable
technologies, [and] the preservation of the whole 
earth."221 Thomas’ use of scientific language to describe 
humans’ contemporary view of their relationship to nature—  
a view virtually indistinguishable from a romantic
orientation toward nature--is typical of the rhetorical 
tension between science and romance found in Thomas’
writings. Romanticism, after all, recognized our mystical 
relationship to nature and sought to maintain nature’s 
delicate balance. In fact, romanticism reacted against the 
human impulse, most often manifested in the scientific
method, to dissect and control nature.
Thomas claims that humans are likely to experience
dissonance upon the realization that their new found
kinship to nature will have to remain subordinate to their
impulse to dominate nature. Thomas assumes that twentieth-
century humankind, much like their nineteenth-century
predecessors, will continue to walk "boot-shod over the
open face of nature, subjugating and civilizing it," for
two primary reasons.222 First, Thomas explains that
humankind has become too deeply involved in nature to
extricate themselves:
[humans] have become, in a painful, unwished for 
way nature itself. [humans] have grown into 
everywhere, spreading like a new growth over the 
entire surface, touching and affecting every other 
kind of life, incorporating [themselves] ... 
[humans] are now the dominant feature of [their] 
own environment ... [they] are now in charge, 
running the place, for better or worse.223
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Second, Thomas argues that humans are biologically 
compelled to dominate nature. He states that our drive to 
control nature is "the most natural of natural events," and 
that humans simply "developed this way...are this kind of 
species."224 In essence, Thomas' depiction of these two 
conflicting orientations toward nature seems symbolic of 
the traditional dichotomy between a scientific and romantic 
view of the world. From a romantic perspective, humans have 
become cognizant of the degree to which they are involved 
in the natural world, and have begun to view themselves as 
an indispensable part in nature’s fragile equilibrium, not 
masters of nature, but dependent on the rest of life for 
their own survival. In short, humans have begun to display 
(i.e. in movements to sustain the wilderness, to preserve 
wildlife, and to refrain from using certain technologies) a 
characteristically romantic wonder and reverence for the 
natural world. On the other hand, from a scientific 
perspective, humans have an equally determined impulse to 
control nature. We seem determined to advance material 
progress, even with the knowledge that the systematic 
destruction of the natural world is likely to result from 
our efforts. Thomas asserts that "if there were such a 
thing as a world mind, it should crack over" these two 
conflicting orientations toward nature.225 Thus, Thomas 
draws upon the language of science and romanticism to 
construct a persuasive synthesis of scientific and romantic
value orientations toward nature. This rhetorical merger
may be capable of accommodating the two competing views of
the natural world. Specifically, Thomas’ scientific-
romantic view suggests that we may be able to advance
material progress, through the use of science, without
sacrificing the knowledge that they are an integral part of
the earth's life system and should, as a result, take
wonder and delight in every aspect of nature, especially
ourselves. Thomas, as one might expect from a scientist,
uses a life process in the natural world as a metaphor to
describe our relationship to nature. He explains that
"certain animals in the sea live by becoming part-animal,
part-plant."226 For example, he claims that a giant clam
usually "engulf[s] algae, which then establish themselves
as complex plant tissues, essential for" both the life of
the plant and the clam.227 Thomas states that humankinds’
domination of nature might be a natural process similar to
that which occurs when certain sea animals, such as a giant
clam, incorporate plant life. In addition, he argues that
humans' subjugation of nature may serve a natural function
in the earth’s evolutionary development:
[humankind’s mastery of nature] might turn out to 
be a special phase in the morphogenesis of the 
earth when it is necessary to have something like 
[humans], for a time anyway, to fetch and carry 
energy, look after new symbiotic arrangements, 
store up information for some future season, do a 
certain amount of ornamenting ... be a handyman 
for the earth.228
Thomas' scientific-romantic vision of humankind’s 
relationship to nature is revealing in two ways. First, 
Thomas argues that the human impulse to control nature and 
to advance material progress, most notably through the use 
of science, is a natural, biological manifestation in the 
earth’s evolutionary development. In effect, this 
perspective persuasively defends science’s central role in 
our relationship to nature. Second, Thomas’ scientific 
explanation of humankinds’ impulse to dominate nature 
persuasively responds to our contemporary, essentially 
romantic perception that we are an indispensable part of 
the natural world and should therefore strive to preserve 
nature’s delicate balance. Thomas concludes that our 
incorporation of nature, as a natural biological process, 
may lead us to discover in one another "sources of 
wonderment and delight that [we] have discovered in other 
manifestations of nature."229 In a romantic vein, he also 
notes that our new attitude toward one another might lead 
to movements for the protection of humans "as a valuable, 
endangered species."230 In sum, Thomas’ scientific-romantic 
orientation toward nature serves as a rhetorical solution 
to humans’ dissonance concerning how best to live in the 
natural world. He employs the language of science to 
countenance human efforts to control nature, suggesting 
that humans are biologically compelled to dominate the 
natural world. Yet, Thomas uses this scientific perspective
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concerning humans* drive to incorporate nature to justify a 
characteristically romantic disposition toward the natural 
world. He suggests that humans* mastery over nature serves 
to support the romantic perception that humans are an 
important part of the earth’s life system and should, as 
such, view the natural world, and especially themselves, 
with wondrous pleasure.
In "Things Unflattened by Science," Thomas employs the 
language of science and romanticism to construct a 
rhetorical synthesis of scientific and romantic 
perspectives concerning humankinds’ relationship to nature. 
This persuasive merger has two components. First, using the 
language of science, Thomas describes the essential quality 
of earth’s life. He claims that the first photographs taken 
from the moon indicate that the earth is a delicate and 
fragile organism, and that the regulatory homeostasis of 
earth’s life exists as complex systems which survive by 
"endless chains of regulatory messages and intricate 
feedback loops."231 Thomas also claims that an 
understanding of earth’s life as a complex of intricate 
systems assumes the "existence of close linkages of 
interdependency involving all existing forms of life, after 
the fashion of an organism."232 Thomas uses this 
scientific view of earth’s life, however, to reject the 
notion that human beings should be relieved of 
responsibility for the earth’s environment "on the ground
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that [the earth] runs itself and has done so, implacably, 
since long before [humans] arrived on the scene."233 
Rather, Thomas’ scientific explanation of earth’s life 
embraces a characteristically romantic value orientation. 
Particularly, he argues that viewing humankind as a life 
system intimately connected with all of earth’s other life 
systems "should impose a new feeling of anxiety for the 
environment everywhere."234 Much like a romantic, Thomas 
asserts that "if [humans] become convinced that [they] 
exist as part of something that is itself alive, [they] are 
more likely to take pains not to do damage to the other 
vital parts around [them]."235 Thus, Thomas’ scientific 
explanation of the earth’s life substantiates a traditional 
romantic view of humans’ relationship to nature. In 
essence, his argument that rational scientific 
investigation documents humans’ intimate connection to all 
other forms of life supports the romantic notion that 
humankind is an indispensable part of the natural world. In 
addition, Thomas’ concern for the environment, though based 
on scientific findings, affirms the romantic view that 
humans should strive to preserve rather than control and 
ultimately destroy nature.
The second component in Thomas* scientific-romantic 
synthesis involves the merger of science and literature to 
develop a better understanding of the earth. For example, 
Thomas claims that photographs taken from the moon, showing
the earth to be a large organism "... and at the same time 
... delicate and fragile ...," have enabled him to find 
meaning in Wallace Stevens' poem, "Man with the Blue 
Guitar."236 Thomas’ interpretation of Stevens’ poem is, 
however, ambiguous. Thomas claims that Stevens’ "Man with 
the Blue Guitar" is a "... a long poem, alive with 
ambiguities ...,"237 and admits that he has no idea whether 
Stevens intended his poem to serve as an explanation for 
the earth’s fragility and delicateness. Yet, Thomas 
concludes (after merely quoting two lines from the poem) 
that Stevens’ poem "... can be read ... as a tale of the 
earth itself."238 Thomas' reading of Stevens’ poem is, in a 
strict sense, tangential to the scientific-romantic
synthesis found in his essays. More important to Thomas’ 
rhetorical merger is his use of poetic language to explain 
nature--poetry, of course, being a linguistic form more 
closely associated with romanticism than with science--and 
the ambiguous manner in which he integrates science and 
romance. In fact, Thomas’ orientation toward nature depends 
for its rhetorical effect on the ambiguous philosophical 
middle ground it achieves between science and romanticism. 
Essentially, his ambiguous integration of scientific and 
romantic language, to explain our relationship to nature, 
maintains the philosophical integrity of both science and 
romanticism, while simultaneously accommodating the 
fundamental differences between these two modes of thought.
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In other words, Thomas’ ambiguous merger of science and
poetry serves as a rhetorical tactic to legitimate both
scientific and romantic explanations of the natural world.
At another point in the essay, however, Thomas argues that
scientific findings validate, and even provide meaning for,
poetic interpretations of nature. For example, he claims
that science is responsible for discovering that the earth
is "... by far the most interesting, engrossing, and
puzzling object in the solar system— maybe even the whole
galaxy . ,."239 He states that while scientific
investigation of the earth should continue, humanists and
poets ought to contemplate the new found understanding of
the earth that science has already provided:
[The earth] needs more research, huge-scale and 
at the same time delicate, highly reductionist 
work, but in the meantime [the earth] is there for
humanists to think about, a free gift from science
and technology, a nice piece of bewilderment for 
the poets ...2 4 0
These remarks indicate that Thomas, much like a romantic,
recognizes the importance of a humanistic evaluation of
nature. Ultimately, however, as one might expect from a
scientist, Thomas seems to subordinate a humanistic
interpretation of the natural world to a rational
scientific explanation. In short, he seems to be suggesting
that science, more so than poetry, has the ability to
appreciate and to explain earth’s mystifying presence in
the universe.
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In "The Lives of a Cell," Thomas uses the language of
science, not only to reject the view that humankind is
separate and qualitatively different from nature, but to
support the traditionally romantic notion that humans are
an integral part of the natural world. Thomas explains that
humankinds' "... most consistent intellectual exertion down
the millennia ..." has been to "... invent an existence
that [they imagine] to be above the rest of life ..."241 He
is particularly concerned with human beings' most recent
efforts to remove themselves from nature:
... Modern Man ... sits in the topmost tiers of 
polymer, glass, and steel, dangling his pulsing 
legs, surveying at a distance the writhing life of 
the planet. In this scenario, Man comes on as a 
stupendous lethal force, and the earth is pictured 
as something delicate . ,.242
These remarks suggest that science has played a critical
role in determining our present relationship to nature.
Specifically, the scientific impulse to dissect and control
the natural world seems embodied in recent human efforts to
detach themselves from nature. In other words, Thomas is
suggesting that humankind has an innate, fundamental desire
to withdraw from nature, which, in modernity, has
manifested itself in scientific efforts to gain an
empirical understanding of nature and to promote material
progress. In fact, Thomas’ remarks indicate that science
has provided the most efficient means (e.g., polymer,
glass, steel) for humankind to fulfill their need to exist
apart from nature. In essence, the implication of Thomas'
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comments is that science has enabled humans to create an 
existence in which they are able reasonably to imagine 
themselves as "a stupendous lethal force,” "above the rest 
of life," presiding over the "writhing life of the 
planet."243 Ultimately, however, Thomas concludes that the 
material progress made possible through the use of science 
has merely created the illusion that humans can live apart 
from nature. In fact, Thomas argues that "the biologic 
science of recent years ..." has demonstrated that 
"[humankind] is embedded in nature."244 More specifically, 
he explains that the interior of the human cell is occupied 
by a number of symbionts, including mitochondria, 
centrioles, and basal bodies, which possess their own DNA 
and RNA and exist, in a strict sense, as entities separate 
from the human cell.245 Thus, human cells are not the "pure 
line entities" that biologists once assumed, but rather are 
complex ecosystems.246 In other words, Thomas argues that 
the cell, which biologists had long held to be the human 
body’s fundamental unit, is itself occupied by separate 
creatures which exist independent from one another and from 
the cell within which they live. More importantly, Thomas 
merges this biologic information with a romantic sense of 
awe and wonder to accentuate humankinds’ mystical, 
interlocked relationship with nature:
[Thomas likes] to think that [the separate living 
creatures existing within his cells] work in 
[his] interest, that each breath they draw for 
[him], but perhaps it is [they] who walk through
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the local park in the early morning, sensing 
[his] senses, listening to [his] music, thinking 
[his] thoughts.247
Thomas’ ruminations concerning the extent to which the
human body’s fundamental unit, the cell, is permeated by
other life forms is characteristic of the mystical
speculation about humans’ relationship to nature that one
might expect from a romantic. Indeed, his reflections lead
to the strange conclusion that human thought and action may
be controlled by symbionts which exist within human cells.
In the end, however, Thomas does not intend readers to
accept the notion that organisms living within human cells
have the ability to govern human thought and action. Any
literal interpretation of Thomas* musings would miss their
rhetorical significance. More appropriately, Thomas’ view
of the effect certain organisms have on human life is best
characterised as intentionally enigmatic. Moreover, the
perplexity of Thomas’ thoughts seems designed precisely to
signify our intimate relationship to other natural life
forms. In sum, Thomas is "... grateful for differentiation
and speciation..." within the human cell, but says that
"... [he] cannot feel as separate an entity as [he] did a
few years ago," before biologists discovered the extent to
which the human cell is occupied by independent organisms.
Finally, Thomas’ scientific-romantic perspective on the
human cell illustrates that human beings are inextricably
connected to other natural life forms and cannot therefore,
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even with the aid of science, remove themselves from 
nature.
In "The Tucson Zoo," Thomas asserts that the general 
public is fearful that .science "... may forever be 
overlooking the whole [of nature] by an endless, obsessive 
preoccupation with ... [its] parts."2 48 Thomas offers a 
rhetorical synthesis of romantic and scientific value 
orientations toward the natural world that allays this fear 
while still defending science’s reductionistic approach. 
This persuasive merger is reflected in the language Thomas
uses to describe an experience he had viewing otters and
beavers at the Tucson Zoo. Drawing upon the language of 
romanticism, Thomas claims that upon first viewing the 
otters and beavers he was "transfixed" and felt only "pure 
elation mixed with amazement at such perfection."249 Thomas 
remembers wanting no part of the science of beavers and 
otters:
... [He] wanted never to know how [beavers and 
otters] performed their marvels; [he] wished for
no news about the physiology of their breathing,
the coordination of their muscles, ...vision, ... 
endocrine systems, ...[and] digestive tracts. [He] 
hoped never to have to think of them as 
collections of cells.250
Like a romantic, Thomas’ first reaction was simply to revel
at the "... full hairy complexity ... of whole, intact
beavers and otters in motion."251 Thomas* romantic sense of
awe and wonder for beavers and otters lasted, however, for
only a few moments; then he adopted a more scientific,
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reductionist attitude and began to wonder— not about the 
details of beavers and otters— but rather about the effect 
that viewing them might have had on him. He states that in 
the instant he began to examine his behavior toward beavers 
and otters he "... lost all the wonder and the sense of 
being overwhelmed [by them]."252
Moreover, as one might expect from a scientist, Thomas 
argues that humans are endowed with genes which code their 
reaction to nature. For example, humans are genetically 
stamped with unalterable patterns of response, ready to be 
released in the presence of beavers and otters. Thus, 
Thomas claims that when he stood "flabbergasted, feeling 
exultation and a rush of friendship" while watching beavers 
and otters at the Tucson Zoo, he was merely exhibiting 
instinctive behavior. Thomas also notes, however, that an 
individual’s mechanistic response of surprised affection 
for beavers and otters can be avoided if he uses the full 
power of his conscious mind. In other words, Thomas argues 
that an individual can circumvent his genetically 
programmed response to nature through the act of rational 
thought. This essay exemplifies the merger of romantic and 
scientific values reflected in Thomas’ view of humankinds’ 
relationship to nature. The language Thomas uses to 
describe his reaction to beavers and otters (e.g., He was 
"transfixed," felt "pure elation mixed with amazement," and 
was "flabbergasted, feeling exultation and a rush of
l;
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friendship" for them.) expresses a characteristically 
romantic wonder and reverence. In essence, Thomas' initial 
reaction to beavers and otters--his wanting only to behold 
their complete, unspoiled beauty and to know nothing about 
their details--persuasively underscores the general 
public’s fear that the process of scientific reductionism 
has resulted in science’s general failure to appreciate the 
whole of nature. Thomas’ romantic affection for beavers and 
otters, in effect, legitimates the public’s admiration for 
nature’s pure, undissected elegance. Unlike a romantic, 
however, who might attribute our abiding affection for 
nature to an inexplicable mystical force, Thomas explains 
our affinity for the natural world in scientific language.
Moreover, he seems to reject the romantic notion that 
an individual may find nature a source of profound 
inspiration for discovering, usually in a moment of sudden, 
intuitive understanding, what it means to be a living 
being. Rather, from a scientific viewpoint, Thomas argues 
that humans are biologically compelled to feel a special 
kinship to nature, but are only able to acquire significant 
knowledge about the essence of human existence through the 
act of rational inquiry. Thus, Thomas learned about his 
relationship to beavers and otters, and to nature 
generally, not as a romantic might have--through 
introspection, intuition, emotionalism, or even mysticism, 
though he never discounts these modes of knowing--but
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through the process of scientific reductionism. In other 
words, as one might expect from a scientist, Thomas 
dissected his reaction to the beavers and otters into its 
smallest possible details, before extending his 
investigation to encompass the whole of his experience. 
But a pure romantic would argue that an individual's 
interaction with nature is part of the continuity of life 
and must, as such, be viewed as an irreducible organic 
experience. In fact, from a romantic viewpoint, the 
dividing analytical mind actually destroys the substance of 
individual interaction with nature.
In sum, Thomas’ scientific-romantic view of humans’ 
relationship to nature recognizes the general 
apprehension that scientific reductionism may cause 
scientists to ignore the whole of nature’s beauty and 
complexity. Yet, Thomas’ persuasive merger also approves of 
science’s proclivity to reduce nature to its smallest 
parts.
Thomas and the Moral Demensions of Science 
In "Altruism" and "The Lie Detector" Thomas discusses 
two areas of human behavior--altruism and honesty--more 
likely to concern a romanticist than a scientist. Unlike a 
romantic, however, who might explain these two categories 
of human expression in purely mystic, spiritual terms, 
Thomas merges the language of biology with a public 
nonscientific vocabulary to argue that human altruism and
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honesty are genetically determined moral behaviors. In 
essence, much like a romantic, Thomas views the affection 
and trust humans display for one another as valuable moral 
characteristics of the human personality. Yet, unlike a 
romantic, he does not use mystical or metaphysical language 
to explain human altruism and honesty, but rather argues, 
from a scientific perspective, that these are genetically 
programmed behaviors.
In "Altruism," Thomas claims that humans are
biologically compelled to behave altruistically toward one
another for their continuing survival as a species.
Accordingly, he asserts that "altruism is based on
kinship; by preserving kin, one preserves one’s self."253
Thomas illustrates humans’ instinctive urge to sustain
their species in two ways. First, he claims that individual
altruistic acts among humans, which help to maintain the
survival of humankind, are similar to the singular acts of
self-sacrifice found among other species in nature; though
he principally compares human altruism to the self-
sacrificing behavior of social insects. For example, Thomas
offers a vivid description of how a honeybee is likely to
sacrifice his own life to protect the hive:
When a worker bee, patrolling the frontiers of
the hive, senses the nearness of a human intruder,
the bee’s attack is pure, unqualified suicide; the 
sting is barbed, and in the act of pulling away 
the insect is fatally injured.254
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Thomas is mindful that humanists and others may object to 
his use of the term altruism— a word typically used to 
depict an unusual aspect of human behavior— to describe the 
behavior of what, in their view, are mindless automata.255 
He notes that critics may claim that "a honeybee has no 
connection" to humans, "no brain for figuring out the 
future, no way of predicting the inevitable outcome of the 
that sting."256 In spite of potential objections to his 
view, however, Thomas argues that "... the meditation of 
the 50,000 or so connected minds of a whole hive is not 
that easy to dismiss."257 He asserts that "a multitude of 
bees can tell the time of day, calculate the geometry of 
the sun's position, [and] argue about the best location for 
the next swarm."258 Indeed, Thomas claims that bees "do a 
lot of close observing of other bees,” and may in fact 
understand the fatal consequences that follow the stinging, 
yet do it anyway.259
In addition to recognizing acts of self-sacrifice among 
other species in nature, and most notably among social 
insects, Thomas also identifies an expression of human 
altruism which, in his estimation, exemplifies humankinds’ 
biological compulsion to preserve their species. 
Particularly, he claims that the "... combat marine [who] 
throws himself belly-down on the live grenade in order to 
preserve the rest of the platoon ..." is acting from an 
instinctive urge to protect the human species. Thomas
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recognizes, of course, the vigorous opposition his 
scientific view of altruism may encounter from critics, who 
might argue that altruistic behavior among humans has 
nothing to do with genetics:
... [Critics might claim] that there is no such 
thing as a gene for self-sacrifice, not even a 
gene for helpfulness, or concern, or even 
affection. These attributes are learned from 
society, acquired by cultures, taught by 
example.J6°
These criticisms notwithstanding, Thomas maintains that the 
sharing of similar genes imposes a biological 
responsibility on humans to sustain each other. Moreover, 
he asserts that everything alive on the planet, including 
human beings, fish, sea grass, sandworns, dolphins, 
hamsters, and soil bacteria, "roll [themselves] along 
through [their] generations by replicating DNA and RNA, and 
although the alignments of nucleotides within these 
molecules are different in different species, the molecules 
themselves are fundamentally the same substance."261 Thus 
Thomas reasons that, since humans share genetic 
similarities with all other creatures, they should be 
concerned about all forms of life--indeed the entire earth- 
-”on solidly scientific, reductionist, genetic
grounds."262
Thomas also claims that, in addition to their 
genetically based altruism, humans are biologically 
programmed to be truthful to each other. In "The Lie 
Detector," for example, he explains that the lie detector
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indicates that the human body’s physical reaction to lying
is similar to its responses to various kinds of stress:
... [A lie sets off] a kind of smoke alarm 
somewhere deep in a dark lobule of the brain, 
resulting in the sudden discharge of nerve 
impulses, or the sudden outpouring of 
neurohormones of some sort, or both. The 
outcome, recorded by the lie-detector gadgetry, 
is a highly reproducible cascade of changes in the 
electrical conductivity of the skin,...heart 
rate, and ... manner of breathing ...263
Thus, from a scientific perspective, Thomas relies on the
technology of lie detection to illustrate that lying is an
unnatural act, causing severe stress to an individual’s
central nervous system. Moreover, he claims that if science
had "better instruments, designed for profounder probes, we
might see needles flipping, lines on charts recording
quantitative degrees of meanness of spirit, or a lack of
love."264 Thomas does not, however, wish for such
instruments, but rather claims, in a romantic vein, that
technological devices designed to measure the human spirit
would "somehow belittle the issues involved."265 In other
words, he is glad to know that humans are genetically
programmed for honesty, but would not welcome additional
scientific investigation of human moral characteristics. In
short, much like a romantic, Thomas would rather leave the
source or motivation for human morality open to
speculation. Finally, then, Thomas argues in these two
essays that humans are a moral species by compulsion, at
least in the limited sense that they are biologically
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designed to behave altruistically and honestly toward each 
other.
Thomas, Science, and Humankind’s Relationship to Nature
The merger of romantic and scientific values reflected 
in his orientation of wonder and awe toward nature, as well 
as in his attention to humankind’s moral characteristics, 
is a component in the larger scientific-romantic synthesis 
found in Thomas’ writings. As such, the rhetorical impact 
of this merger deserves evaluation in respect to four 
research questions set forth in this dissertation: Does the 
rhetorical merger of romantic and scientific values 
reflected in the essays reviewed here help to (1) mediate 
the traditional dichotomy between science and humanism? (2) 
envision a cooperative relationship between the scientific 
community and the general public? (3) provide the general 
public a greater role in establishing criteria for 
judgment for private and public decision making? and (4) 
highlight the general public’s capacity to respond to 
aspects of the world inaccessible to the interpretive 
framework of science and ordinary rational thought?
The equivocation between scientific and romantic 
values found in Thomas’ orientation toward certain life 
processes in nature, literature, a human cell, beavers and 
otters, and human altruism and honesty provides a 
rhetorical middle ground capable of mitigating the long 
standing dispute between science and humanism. Scientists,
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eager to continue scientific exploration of nature, should 
welcome Thomas’ view that our impulse to dominate nature 
and to advance material progress, through the use of 
science, is a natural, biological manifestation of the 
earth’s evolutionary development. Thus, in keeping with a 
scientific perspective which encourages human intervention 
in nature, scientists may find satisfaction in Thomas’ 
claim that humans may be motile tissue specialized for 
receiving information, perhaps operating as a nervous 
system for the entire earth. Scientists may also appreciate 
Thomas’ assertion that our domination of nature is a 
natural process similar to that which occurs when certain 
sea animals, such as a giant sea clam, incorporate plant 
life. Finally, Thomas’ claim that the most efficient means 
for acquiring information about nature, and thus about the 
essence of human existence, is through the process of 
scientific reductionism is consistent with the overall 
program of science. In short, Thomas’ rhetorical 
perspective defends science’s pivotal role in humankinds’ 
relationship to nature.
In contrast, humanists should welcome Thomas’ claim 
that humans are an indispensable part of nature’s delicate 
equilibrium, not masters of nature, but dependent on all 
other forms of life for their own preservation. Though he 
seems to subordinate a humanistic interpretation of nature 
to a rational scientific explanation, Thomas* recognition
that poets are capable of making significant contributions 
to humankinds’ understanding of the universe is important. 
Thomas’ mystical speculation concerning the extent to which 
a human cell is permeated by other life forms is also 
consistent with humanism, for Thomas’ biologic explanation 
of the human cell illustrates the intimate, mysterious 
nature of our relationship to other living creatures. 
Finally, humanists are likely to be pleased that Thomas 
describes the affection and trust humans display for one 
another as valuable characteristics of the human 
personality, but disagree with his claim that we are 
genetically programmed for altruism and truthfulness. In 
fact, Thomas seems correct to assert that humanists and 
others may object to his claim that altruistic acts among 
humans are similar to acts of self-sacrifice among other 
species in nature. Humanists might argue, for instance, 
that Thomas is incorrect to claim that the combat marine 
who offers his life in order to preserve the rest of the 
platoon is acting purely from an instinctive urge to 
protect the human species, and assert that the marine is 
engaging in an act of heroic individualism. Essentially, 
they might claim that the emphasis Thomas places on 
genetics when seeking to explain human behavior unduly 
diminishes the significance of individual free-will. In 
short, humanists might object that words about society and 
human relationships, such as altruism and honesty, should
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be used to express moral rather than scientific truths. On 
balance, however, humanists are likely to be pleased with 
Thomas’ recognition that humankind is intimately connected 
with other life forms and should work to preserve the 
natural environment.
The merger of roaantic and scientific values reflected 
in Thomas’ orientation of wonder and awe toward nature, as 
well as in his attention to humankind’s moral 
characteristics, envisions a cooperative relationship 
between the scientific community and the general public, 
particularly in Thomas' admission that upon first viewing 
the otters and beavers at the Tucson Zoo he was transfixed 
and felt pure elation mixed with amazement. Thomas’ initial 
response of wanting simply to behold the beavers and 
otters’ complete, unspoiled beauty, and to know nothing 
about their details, works to alleviate the general 
public’s fear that the process of scientific reductionism 
has resulted in science’s general failure to appreciate the 
whole of nature’s beauty and complexity. Indeed, there is 
wisdom in the way Thomas’ support for scientific 
exploration of nature is tempered by his understanding that 
the material progress made possible through the use of 
science has merely created the illusion that humankind can 
live apart from nature. Perhaps Thomas’ recognition that 
scientific reductionism may potentially harm our delicate 
equilibrium with nature will encourage the general public
139
to take a greater role in establishing criteria for 
evaluating scientific projects which may damage the natural 
environment. Moreover, Thomas’ claim that humankind is not 
separate and qualitatively different from nature invites 
the public to adapt a more circumspect view of technologies 
designed to insulate humans from the natural world. 
Finally, Thomas’ initial awe and wonder for the beavers and 
otters at the Tucson Zoo should reinforce an increasing 
awareness that the whole of nature possesses an ineffable 
beauty inaccessible to scientific reductionism. As a 
result, perhaps through direct interaction with nature, 
independent of the interpretive framework of science, the 
individual layperson is directed to be more open to 
intuitive insight about the quality of human existence and 
his or her relationship to the natural world.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified two popular romantic themes 
in Lewis Thomas’ public science— a wonder at and awe of 
nature, and a concern for humankind’s moral 
characteristics--which are merged with scientific 
rationality in Thomas’ essays. The chapter also examined 
the persuasive impact this scientific-romantic synthesis 
might have in establishing a more cooperative relationship 
between the scientific community and the general public. 
Chapter five offers a summary of the preceding chapters, 
and speculates about the overall meaning of Thomas’ writing
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for the rhetoric of public science and for the relationship 
between science and culture in general.
Chapter Five
This dissertation analyzed twenty-four essays from the 
popular scientific writings of Lewis Thomas. The author 
focused upon how Thomas, as a public scientist, depicts 
science as a worthwhile intellectual and pragmatic activity 
and responds to certain historical-cultural problems 
arising from the practice of science. A review of the 
literature on romanticism, information gathered from 
writings on the rhetoric of science and scientific 
rationality, and an examination of cultural history were 
used to aid interpretation. A close reading of Thomas’ 
essays reveals that his romantic orientation toward the 
world is characterized by six major themes: (1) faith in 
the unconscious mind, (2) a vindication of the individual, 
(3) a predilection for diversity, ambiguity and 
imperfection, (4) a preoccupation with qualities that are 
different, remote or mysterious in humans, (5) wonder at 
and awe of nature, and (6) a concern for humankind’s moral 
characteristics. These six romantic tenets were identified 
as they appear in Thomas’ essays; the themes’ strategic 
location, function and rhetorical significance was 
assessed. The author concluded that Thomas persuasively 
merges these popular romantic themes with traditional 
scientific values. The result is a scientific-romantic
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synthesis that functions rhetorically to make Thomas’ 
version of science palatable to the nonscientist. This 
chapter will provide conclusions about the rhetorical 
nature and effectiveness of Thomas’ scientific-romantic 
synthesis as a method for mediating the traditional 
controversy between science and humanism, and establishing 
a more cooperative relationship between the scientific 
community and the general public. Conclusions regarding how 
this dissertation’s research findings contribute to 
previous scholarship on public scientific communication 
will be suggested.
Science Vs. Humanism
The dialectic found between science and humanism in 
C.P. Snow’s "Two Cultures" provides a useful intellectual 
framework for evaluating the rhetorical impact of Thomas’ 
merger of scientific and romantic language. Snow argued 
that the modern intellectual life of Western society was 
being divided into two mutually exclusive cultures: the 
literary and the scientific. According to Snow, literary 
culture is composed of novelists, poets, playwrights and 
literary scholars; scientific culture is made up of 
physical scientists. Snow claimed that a gulf of mutual 
incomprehension, and in some instances hostility and 
dislike, exists between these two groups.266
The intellectual division which Snow finds between 
science and humanism, while perhaps not universal, clearly
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exists in contemporary Western culture. Writers seeking to
explain the intellectual division between science and
humanism often emphasize that science and art approach
reality with sharply different methods of inquiry, each of
which provides a distinct contribution to humankind’s
understanding of nature. For example, Ernest G. Bormann
notes that the "scientific method furnishes us with
knowledge about the world that consists of generalizations
and specific statements of fact," while art depends upon an
intuitive approach to knowledge and can be a "stimulus to
generate a kind of knowledge of the senses."267 The British
Poet, C. Day Lewis, claims that "poetry deepens our insight
into the qualitative domain of feeling and value, whereas
science explores the quantitative domain of measurement and
regularity."268 Melvin Rader and Bertram Jessup assert that
science and art are different in aim and value:
Science seeks truth to fact, art gives truth to
felt fact and felt imaginary things. In science,
we can say, man is observer— ideally, an 
instrument--intent on knowing what things are 
apart from human desires, wishes, hopes, fears.
In art, man is, in part, of the very substance of 
what he shows, tells, imagines.269
The differing aims and values of scientific objectivism and
artistic subjectivism create the potential for tension
between the artistic world and the legions of science.
Scientists may be inclined to emphasize the unprecedented
material success afforded by scientific research,
underscoring the direct connection between the
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technological advances of science and the rising standard 
of living. Indeed, given science's superior method for 
problem solving, scientists may potentially claim a 
monopoly of knowledge and intellectual preeminence over 
humanists. At the least, scientists may display hubris as a 
result of the fundamental inequality of citizenship which 
exists between science and the humanities in American 
culture.270
Humanists typically acknowledge science's success in 
understanding the physical universe, while also 
recognizing serious limitations in the scientific paradigm. 
For example, Ernesto Grassi’s examination of the historical 
tension between Italian Humanism and the scientific 
tradition suggests that the scientific method is concerned 
only with universals (i.e., with claims that are valid for 
all times and places) and thus ignores the particular 
experience of the individual.271 Grassi remarks that 
humanism places great importance on literature as a means 
for understanding and explaining the human condition. 
Particularly humanists argue that literature, unlike 
scientific reductionism in which the individual element is 
lost, "is a way of forming meaning without losing the 
details and emotions of an event. The fable, the tale, the 
narrative have a universal meaning, but this meaning is 
achieved through the relating of particular events and 
q u a l i t i e s ."272 Like Grassi, the American novelist, Walker
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Percy, who is trained as a physician and who maintains a 
continuing interest in science, also recognizes limitations 
inherent in the scientific method. Percy argues that 
scientific reductionism provides generalizations about the 
similarities between one person and another, but is unable 
to explain the individual himself.273 He claims that 
science "stop[s] short at the very point where it matters 
to [the individual] man," which is "what he is in 
himself."274 Percy contends that art— and particularly the 
novel--illuminates areas of human experience inaccessible 
to science, and is therefore, as an instrument of truth, 
potentially as valuable as the scientific method.273
This dissertation has contended that Thomas’ public 
scientific writings persuasively mediate the traditional 
tension between science and humanism. Previous research, 
however, has given only cursory acknowledgement to Thomas’ 
rhetorical skill, and has ignored whether Thomas' public 
science mediates the long standing controversy between 
science and humanism. For example, Barbara Lounsberry 
suggests that Thomas’ essays revive several humanistic 
themes fundamental to nineteenth century American 
literature and, though recognizing his essays as a model of 
lucid science writing, concludes that posterity may regard 
Thomas’ greater contribution to be in literature rather 
than science.276 This dissertation has argued that Thomas’ 
popular scientific essays do more than resurrect
humanistic themes important to a nineteenth century 
American literary tradition, and should be regarded as an 
aspect of rhetoric rather than exclusively or simply as an 
aspect of science or literature. In other words, Thomas’ 
essays deserve recognition not only as an exemplary model 
of science writing crafted for the nonscientist, or as an 
example of science writing which happens to possess a 
certain aesthetic, literary value, but also as a persuasive 
response to the on going dispute between science and 
humanism. Specifically, Thomas’ merger of scientific and 
romantic language is strategically designed to locate 
humanistic values within the context of contemporary 
science, and suggests that human potential is best realized 
in a single, well balanced culture, wherein scientists and 
humanists recognize the unique value of each other’s 
epistemological perspective on nature. Hence, Thomas’ 
scientific-romantic synthesis serves as a rhetorical form 
to encourage scientists and humanists to work cooperatively 
to combine science’s efficacy for increasing human 
knowledge and power with humanism’s appreciation for 
individual human freedom, moral development, and aesthetic 
spontaneity.
As a scientist, Thomas has great confidence in the 
scientific method as a means for acquiring a comprehensive 
knowledge about nature and for solving human problems. 
Indeed, he professes that science will eventually answer
any questions to be asked about nature or about humans. In 
maintaining a rhetorical allegiance to the scientific 
ethos, Thomas adheres to a value system that emphasizes 
human rationality, natural perfection and changelessness, a 
willingness to view technology as a tool for human 
progress, and an appreciation for attempts to control 
nature. Yet, Thomas' underlying fidelity to these core 
scientific values, and recognition of the extraordinary 
capacity or even impressive record science has for 
explaining natural phenomena, is expressed with a sense of 
humility for all that science has yet to learn about 
nature. Unlike other public scientists (e.g., Carl Sagan) 
who typically exult science’s substantial, increasingly 
sophisticated body of knowledge, Thomas celebrates 
science’s ability to provide revelations of human ignorance 
about nature. In other words, rather than glorify science 
for the significant strides it has made toward 
understanding nature, as other public scientists usually 
do, Thomas celebrates science as an incomplete field of 
inquiry, perplexed by certain ambiguities in nature; he 
cautions against presenting the corpus of scientific 
learning, impressive though it may be, as a prodigious 
structure of coherent information capable of explaining 
almost every aspect of nature. In essence, Thomas views 
science as an indispensable means for helping humankind 
understand and control nature, but does not regard science
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as humankind’s savior. In fact, his romantic version of 
science recognizes that science simply ignores, or is 
presently incapable of explaining, certain fundamental 
facets of human existence, and acknowledges that humanistic 
criticism of science, particularly for neglecting the 
complete intellectual capacity and particular experience of 
the individual, is a rhetorical exigence which threatens to 
undermine the sanctity of science in American culture.
The Mediational Effect of Romantic Public Science 
Yet, specifically how does the scientific-romantic 
synthesis in Thomas’ popular scientific essays mediate the
traditional tension between science and humanism? And how
is this dissertation’s examination of Thomas* 
popularization of science relevant to the study of the
rhetoric of popular science? One way to conceptualize the 
mediational effect Thomas* romantic science has concerning 
the dispute between science and humanism, and to understand 
how this study interfaces with previous scholarship on 
popular scientific communication, is to recall Lessl’s
explanation of priestly rhetoric. As noted in the survey of 
literature on popular science in chapter one, Lessl claims 
that priestly rhetoric characteristically promotes and 
maintains the specialized values of an elite subculture, 
but is directed toward the broader social groups within 
which it is situated. He contends that priestly 
communication "reminds people of what they might become,
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attempting to change the identity of its intended audiences 
by nudging them gradually into the symbolic environment of 
an elite social group."277 One important place to look for 
priestly rhetoric, Lessl observes, is in the public 
discourse of contemporary scientists. Accordingly, given 
Lessl’s theoretical perspective, Thomas’ popular rendering 
of science is an example of priestly communication.
As priestly rhetoric, Thomas' romantic science shares 
and legitimates the specialized values of an elite 
scientific subculture, but is directed toward reducing the 
philosophical differences between scientists and humanists, 
and toward encouraging the general public to appreciate 
science’s ability to cultivate the full measure of human 
potential. Lessl reminds us that public scientific efforts 
to mediate science’s division from the rest of the culture 
often must step outside science to establish common ground 
with a nonscientific audience, using symbols of 
identification through which the nonscientist can mediate 
reality and organize his or her actions.278 Anderson 
expresses a similar notion when explaining that the science 
reporter often draws materials for rhetorical argument from 
the common conception of the good, what Aristotle called 
forms, common places or topoi.279 Like other public 
scientists, Thomas moves beyond a strict fidelity to 
scientific orthodoxy in order to appeal to the broad 
aspirations and values of the nonscientist. But his public
science raises issues relevant to the common good and 
particularly to the enduring and troubling
moral/scientific issues of our time. For example, his 
romantic science combines scientific and humanistic
symbols of identification, particularly merging a 
scientific emphasis on human rationality with a humanistic 
concern for literature, human moral development, creative 
imagination, the unconscious mind, and for important public 
issues such as the threat of thermonuclear war, and the 
preservation of the natural environment. On balance, this 
persuasive union is characterized by a sense of ambiguity, 
and even, to a lesser degree, irony and paradox, which 
promotes a unified diversity between these traditionally 
divergent scientific and humanistic topoi. In other words, 
Thomas* scientific-romantic synthesis shares a perspective 
on nature and the substance of human existence which 
equivocates between the symbolic world of science and 
humanism. The result is a persuasive merger that upholds 
the philosophical integrity of science and humanism while 
accommodating the long standing differences between these 
two modes of thought.
An important characteristic of Thomas’ rhetoric, then, 
is that is deliniates the topoi with which the public might 
understand science and begin to reason through techno- 
scientific disputes. Specifically, Thomas suggests that 
deliberation of social, ethical, and moral issues in the
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relationship between science and the general public ought 
to invoke certain scientific-romantic structures which help 
to adjudicate conflicting versions of public moral action. 
For example, Thomas would probably view genetic engineering 
as an example of scientific inquiry that is likely to 
arouse debate over the social, ethical and moral 
consequences of science. Given his scientific-romantic 
perspective, Thomas might urge us to adapt a cautious open- 
mindedness when attempting to resolve conflicting public 
moral views regarding the extent to which societal 
concerns should govern genetic engineering research. He 
might encourage the scientific community to measure the 
value of individual human dignity against the benefit of 
scientific advance and to be ever mindful of the 
potentially grave consequences of altering natural 
evolution of the human species. On the other hand, Thomas 
might remind the public that successful scientific inquiry 
usually depends upon freedom of investigation and that 
genetic engineering, while not without risk, is potentially 
valuable as an avenue for curing such common illnesses as 
cancer and heart disease.
Romantic Science Vis-A-Vis The General Public 
In addition to appealing to the social and imaginative 
concerns of humanists, Thomas’ romantic science should 
allay the general public’s concerns over the potential 
ethical and moral implications of science. Communication
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scholars have observed that the highly specialized language 
of science and technology have increasingly usurped the 
role of ordinary language in public policy debates over 
social, ethical, and political questions, and have proven 
particularly inadequate to bridge the intellectual division 
which exists between expert and citizen when scientific or 
technological matters impinge upon ordinary life. In 
short, the scholarly consensus seems to be that technical 
reasoning effectively denies citizen equal status with 
expert in discussion of public policy and is therefore an 
insufficient means for resolving public controversy in a 
democratic society.280
An intellectual tension is likely to exist, then, 
between the scientific community and the general public 
when scientists enter the public arena to argue on behalf 
of a scientific agenda. Hence several important questions 
are raised concerning the possible rhetorical effect of 
Thomas’ public science: How might Thomas’ romantic-
scientific synthesis address the general public’s 
increasing concern over the ethical and moral consequences 
of science? How might his persuasive merger provide the 
public a greater role in establishing criterion for 
judgement for private and public decision-making? How might 
Thomas’ scientific-romantic orientation highlight the 
general public's capacity to respond to aspects of the 
world inaccessible to the interpretive framework of science
and ordinary rational thought? One way to approach these 
questions, and to determine generally whether Thomas’ 
scientific-romantic synthesis persuasively responds to the 
lay person’s apprehension about the role of science in 
American culture, is to recall Fisher's explanation of 
public moral argument.281 Fisher explains that public moral 
argument, unlike reasoned discourse occurring is 
specialized communities, "is a form of controversy that 
inherently crosses fields," and is "not contained in the 
way that legal, scientific, or theological arguments are by 
subject matter, particular conceptions of argumentative 
competence, and well recognized rules of advocacy."282 He 
claims that public moral argument is "made available for 
consumption and persuasion of the polity at large," is 
aimed "at what Aristotle called untrained thinkers," and is 
"moral in the sense that it is founded on ultimate 
questions— of life and death, of how persons should be 
defined and treated, of preferred patterns of living."283
Fisher's perspective on public moral argument provides 
a useful framework for understanding the rhetorical force 
of Thomas' efforts to defend the sanctity of science and to 
bridge the philosophical division between the scientific 
community and the general public. Thomas seems to 
understand that the specialized language of science may be 
losing its ability to shape public consciousness and to 
engage in public moral argument. In fact, his romantic
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science is not confined by the technical reasoning and 
subject matter of science, but employs ordinary language to 
discuss scientific and technological issues which directly 
effect the individual citizen and are pivotal to defining 
science’s role in the culture. Yet in addition to sharing 
scientific information in the relatively nontechnical idiom 
of the general public, as all public science must do, 
Thomas’ scientific-romantic merger operates in a manner 
unique to the current body of public scientific discourse, 
particularly to combine an emphasis on human rationality 
with a moral and aesthetic vision for individual freedom 
and a sound social order. The result is a romantic science 
that shares a scientific interpretation of reality while 
still envisioning a cooperative relationship between the 
scientific community and the general public. The 
complementary relationship Thomas conceives between the 
field of science and the ordinary citizen is particularly 
evident when he defends the process of scientific 
reductionism as the most efficient means for acquiring 
information about nature, yet recognizes the public’s fear 
that science’s proclivity to dissect nature into its 
smallest parts is responsible for science’s general failure 
to appreciate the whole of nature. His argument that our 
subjugation of nature may be a natural function in the 
earth’s evolutionary development persuasively reduces the 
dissonance that we are likely to experience upon the
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realization that our kinship to nature will have to remain 
subordinate to our impulse to dominate nature. In essence, 
his scientific-romantic view of nature suggests that 
humankind may be able to advance material progress, through 
the use of science, without sacrificing the knowledge that 
we are an integral part of the earth's life system.
Philip Wander has observed that "so long as talk about 
science locates itself in the hypothetical space of... 
modes of thought which make a virtue out of being detached 
from human history and the everyday world, it will remain 
possible for scientists to enjoy the comforts of consulting 
secure in the belief that all is right with the world."284 
Unlike most traditional scientists, who continue to locate 
science in abstract modes of discourse, such as mathematics 
or logic, Thomas articulates a scientific perspective in 
the idiom of the intelligent lay person. Rather than strive 
to be a neutral and dispassionate observer, Thomas is 
filled with a sense of awe and wonder for the complex 
beauty of the human species and for nature's deep degree of 
mystery. In this sense, he gives voice to what most 
scientists probably feel but rarely express publicly. He 
understands that the world has a great many serious 
problems, some of which endanger humankinds’ very 
existence, and that "the dissociation of science from 
morality, ethics, and politics is no longer possible."285 
For example, Thomas’ romantic-scientific perspective is
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passionately concerned that the prospect of thermonuclear 
war threatens the continuity of human civilization. Yet 
unlike a traditional scientist, who is likely to rely 
solely on empirical data to emphasize the gravity of 
thermonuclear weapons, Thomas persuasively merges aesthetic 
and rational perspectives to warn against danger of atomic 
genocide. For instance, he recognizes that music’s ability 
to heighten human awareness may be a more persuasive topos 
than simply acknowledging the ways in which rational, 
empirical data enhance perception. Hence, as a means for 
increasing awareness of the horrors of nuclear war, Thomas 
recognizes an emotional link between the melancholic 
meditation on death evoked in Mahler’s Ninth Symphony and 
the image of thermonuclear bombs exploding over the great 
capitals of the world.
Thomas’ effort to mediate potentially disturbing 
social, ethical, and moral issues in the relationship 
between science and the general public extends beyond the 
problem of thermonuclear war. For example, he is sensitive 
to the popular fear that technology, and particularly 
computers, will destroy the unpredictability and 
improbability of human thought that is necessary to the 
process of social evolution. While recognizing that 
computers possess an excellent facility for problem solving 
and are, along with other technologies, important agents 
for the unification and organization of collective human
behavior, Thomas also suggests that computers, and
technology generally, will always serve a passive role
subject to human control. Essentially Thomas preserves 
technology’s privileged status in society while still 
responding to the public’s concern that computers will
diminish the importance of, and perhaps dominate, human 
intellect. Thomas’ concern for the sanctity of the
individual vis-a-vis the potentially dehumanizing effects
of science is also evident in his caution to experimental
psychologists to refrain from attempts to control humans’ 
visceral organs. Indeed, the general public is likely to 
agree with Thomas’ assertion that scientific attempts to 
teach humans to control their internal biology might 
present the individual with exhausting and debilitating
responsibilities; in Thomas’ view, the individual is not 
prepared for the emotional and intellectual responsibility 
that would accompany the ability to regulate his or her 
internal domain. Rather than lead to greater autonomy, this 
type of scientific investigation might effectively estrange 
humans from their external environment and deny an 
individual a deeper appreciation of his or her humanity. In 
essence, the public is likely to view Thomas’ opposition to 
scientific efforts to regulate viscera as a persuasive
defense of individual freedom.
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Romantic Science: A Comprehensive View Of The Cosmos 
The modern scientific world view has removed human 
meaning and moral value from our relationship with nature 
and from our conception of the cosmos. As Janice Rushing 
notes, the progress wrought by the Enlightenment and the 
Scientific Revolution has left many with an undeniable 
"sense of fragmentation and separation--from their world, 
their fellow human beings, and themselves.286 In The 
Return To Cosmology, however, Stephen Toulmin observes that 
the scientist’s traditional posture as "theoros" or 
spectator whose task is simply to report objectively on the 
workings of nature, and to abide by a belief in the value 
neutrality of science, cannot be maintained. Toulmin claims 
that "... the expansion of scientific inquiry into the 
human realm is compelling science to ... develop a more 
coordinated view of the world, embracing both the world of 
nature and the world of humanity."287 In short, Toulmin 
states that scientists have to consider the "moral 
significance of the actions that comprise even the very 
doing of science."288 Similarly Lessl argues that "the 
moral neutrality that scientists wish to claim for their 
work does not obtain in the public world where the 
artificial distinction between scientific works and its 
consequences become invisible."289 Lessl adds that, as the 
negative consequences of science become more apparent,
". .. a rhetoric of science that is successfully to maintain
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a working relationship with the larger public that supports 
science must respond to the moral meanings of science in 
the world."290 From Lessl’s perspective, "such a response 
moves scientific discourse from its traditional realm of 
the epistemic into the realm of the ethical, which means in 
effect into the narrative arena of public dialogue."291
Lewis Thomas seems to understand that science’s strict 
reliance on rationalism and naturalistic explanation 
ignores certain ineffable, though nonetheless important, 
aspects of human existence. In fact, while still 
emphasizing the scientific method, his romantic-scientific 
perspective adapts a more comprehensive view of the cosmos 
than traditional science, restoring a "sense of unity, 
order, and proportion" to humanity’s relationship to 
nature.292 For instance, Thomas’ preoccupation with 
mysterious phenomena, such as the operation of the 
unconscious mind, the importance of human error and 
imperfection in leading to advanced levels of rational 
thought, and the significance of language in defining the 
human species, suggests that certain facets of human 
existence are presently beyond the purview of scientific 
explanation. Thomas’ recognition of the scientific model’s 
limitations encourages us to depend on intuitive and 
emotional judgment along with logical processes for problem 
solving, and to be more willing to turn to other forms of 
authority in both private and public decision-making.
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Indeed Thomas' preoccupation with mysterious phenomena, in 
addition to encouraging our emotional and intuitive 
capacities, also delineates the bounds of science from 
metaphysics, suggesting perhaps that every astute public 
scientist is also a metaphysician. Thus Thomas’ romantic 
science strives to fulfill what Rushing has termed our 
"yearning for wholeness" in the cosmos, and to heal our 
sense of fragmentation and separation from nature.293 
Thomas’ effort to reinsert humanity into the scientific 
worldview, while apparent in all his essays on nature, is 
particularly evident in his description of an experience he 
had while viewing otters and beavers. He claims to have 
been filled with a sense of awe and wonder for these 
creatures, yet at the same time to have been compelled to 
adopt a scientific reductionist attitude in order to 
speculate about the effect that viewing them had on him. 
Thomas reaction to the beavers and otters exemplifies the 
dissonance we experience when recognizing, on the one hand, 
that we are deeply and perhaps mysteriously connected to 
the natural world, and realizing, on the other hand, that 
humankind possesses a seemingly innate drive to dissect and 
control nature.
While generally optimistic about science’s role in 
human affairs, Thomas recognizes that the fruits of 
scientific and technological advance in the twentieth 
century have been bitter-sweet. He notes, for instance,
that as science has learned to cure disease, develop 
computers which possess a vastly improved upon though 
nonetheless human-like faculty for problems solving, and 
harness the forces of nature for human prosperity, so also 
has it developed the capability to restrict human autonomy, 
lay waste the natural landscape, and extinguish 
civilization. Thomas’ enthusiasm for the prospects of 
science is tempered, then, by an appreciation of science’s 
potentially destructive force. Certainly Thomas is in favor 
of science as a most effective means for solving human 
problems, yet recognizes that science’s increasingly 
disturbing consequences jeopardize public confidence in the 
scientific enterprise. In essence, Thomas seems to 
understand that popular distrust of science is likely to 
exist so long as scientists ignore the ethical and moral 
results of their work. Consequently, he portrays a 
moralistic vision of science that is likely to strengthen 
public trust in the scientific enterprise. For example, 
while generally opposed to scientific investigation of 
human moral characteristics, Thomas’ romantic science 
merges the language of science with a public nonscientific 
vocabulary to argue that certain categories of expression, 
such as human altruism and honesty, are genetically 
determined moral behaviors. In other words, while generally 
opposed to scientific efforts to determine the genetic 
roots of humans’ basic moral characteristics, Thomas relies
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nevertheless on scientific language to demonstrate that 
humans are a moral species by compulsion, at least in the 
limited sense that they are biologically designed to behave 
altruistically and honestly toward one another. In sum, 
Thomas’ romantic-scientific orientation persuasively 
accentuates a humane science, capable even of identifying 
and reinforcing virtuous characteristics of the human
personality. In doing so, Thomas’ public science aids in
establishing a more cooperative relationship between the 
scientific community and the general public.
Generally speaking, scientists who enter the public 
narrative arena to seek identification with a nonscientific 
audience encounter a rhetorical dilemma, particularly 
since, as Lessl notes, "the material of science is 
intrinsically foreign to the uninitiated layman, and to
step outside of science to find common ground is to betray
the ethos of the scientific community."294 Thus, as Lessl 
adds, "one should not be surprised to find the popularizer 
of science regarded by his professional peers as an outcast 
or heretic."295 On balance, the most serious limitation of 
Thomas’ synthesis is that it may not resolve the basic 
tension between science and humanism; science and humanism 
may, in essence, be logically and philosophically 
incompatible. Notwithstanding Thomas may have gone as far 
as possible to resolve the fundamental tension between the 
two perspectives. Ultimately, the ever present ambiguity in
Thomas' work may reflect his own uncertainty about the 
compatibility between science and humanism. This being the 
case, the scientific community is likely to regard Thomas’ 
popular rendering of science with ambivalence. 
Particularly, scientists would probably prefer that Thomas 
advance a more traditional view of science as a rigorous, 
routinized activity largely concerned with establishing and 
systematizing facts, principles, and methods; scientists 
are likely to wish that Thomas placed greater emphasis on 
science’s ability to clarify ambiguity in nature and to 
establish solid, fundamental conclusions about the natural 
world. In short, scientists probably wish that Thomas 
placed greater emphasis on the impressive record science 
has for explaining natural phenomena, and are likely to 
view Thomas’ romantic portrayal of science as a violation 
of the scientific ethos. Despite their potential 
misgivings, however, scientists should be satisfied that 
Thomas' public scientific essays show a significant degree 
of fidelity to scientific orthodoxy, and use the language 
of romanticism primarily for the rhetorical purpose of 
depicting science as a humane discipline able to serve 
human instincts for conduct and beauty. In fact, scientists 
are probably aware that the public’s increasing 
apprehension about the social consequences of science could 
jeopardize financial support for certain types of 
scientific research, and that Thomas’ romantic portrayal of
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science offers persuasive commentary on a range of timely 
scientific issues in a manner likely to encourage public 
support for the scientific enterprise. Finally, scientists 
may appreciate that Thomas’ public scientific perspective 
manages a realistic, sensitive and discriminating balance 
between science’s unrelenting quest for knowledge and the 
general public’s escalating acknowledgment that science is 
incapable of solving all human problems and is, to an 
increasing extent, responsible for creating additional 
ones.
Conclusion
In the twentieth century science has had a pervasive 
intellectual influence on the life of western society. The 
scientific method, as the predominant paradigm for problem 
solving, has been hugely successful as a means for 
unraveling the mysteries of nature and for furnishing 
humankind, not only with its most basic needs, but with a 
standard of material comfort unthinkable only a century 
ago. Yet, despite the progress wrought by scientific 
investigation, the general public has become deeply 
skeptical about the ethical, social, and practical price 
that must be paid for the fruits of scientific advance.296 
Furthermore, the intellectual dichotomy which Snow finds 
between science and humanism, while perhaps not ubiquitous, 
is still evident in American culture. Lewis Thomas’ public 
scientific essays reflect a persuasive effort to identify
and to mitigate the intellectual tensions that exist 
between science and the rest of society. In fact, Thomas* 
scientific-romantic synthesis operates as a sophisticated 
rhetorical form for acknowledging both the hope and despair 
that science has given us. His persuasive merger defends 
the sanctity of science while still recognizing the need to 
reinsert human meaning into science's orientation toward 
the natural world. In other words, Thomas' romantic science 
embraces both the world of science, where the pursuit of 
knowledge about nature, at whatever level, is considered a 
priority which should never be impeded, and the world of 
humanity, where concern for the individual is of utmost 
importance. In essence, Thomas’ persuasive synthesis 
provides scientists with a new ethic, by suggesting that 
scientists who wish to maintain a preeminent role for 
science in American culture can no longer afford to view 
themselves strictly as observers of nature, but must 
consider themselves as agents capable of rearranging the 
natural world and of reconstituting the substance of human 
existence; indeed, Thomas’ public science intimates that 
the potential social consequences of scientific activity 
necessitate that scientists contemplate the social and 
moral significance of their work. In other words, Thomas 
seems to agree with Toulmin's claim that contemporary 
scientists are having to rejoin the rest of humanity and 
participate once again in the "moral quandaries... that
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arise for us all," in our attempts to reconcile the values 
of action and reflection.297
Finally, Thomas* merger of popular romantic themes and 
traditional scientific values facilitates constructive 
dialogue between the scientific community and the general 
community, and in so doing serves as an important 
intellectual measure for evaluating the ideas, values, and 
aspirations of our culture. This study, however, provided 
but one example of how the scientific-romantic synthesis 
functions in public scientific discourse. It remains to be 
seen whether Thomas’ provocative use of this persuasive 
merger will stand as an isolated example among the corpus 
of public scientific literature, or whether other public 
scientists, recognizing Thomas* rhetorical accomplishment, 
will eventually use the language of romanticism in their 
own efforts to share and legitimate a scientific 
interpretation of reality. In any event, Thomas’ effective 
use of the scientific-romantic synthesis should alert 
researchers that public scientists, who understand the 
challenge to science from other interest groups, are 
capable of developing sophisticated rhetorical strategies 
to protect science’s privileged status in society, and to 
clarify science’s moral role in this society.
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